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AIR DEFENSE UNITS: TRAINING AND RELATED ACTIVITIES

Officer Training Discussed

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 1 Aug 79 p 2

[Article by Lt Gen Avn V. Ponomarev, member of military council, chief of political directorate of Order of Lenin Moscow ADD: "Efficiency and a Creative Approach: An Officer's Self-Indoctrination"]

[Text] These days the district's units are greeting young officers who have graduated from military educational institutions. It happens this way every year, but it is always a major event for us.

Time flies quickly. There are not only artillery battalion and squadron commanders, but regimental commanders as well among those who completed higher military schools at the beginning of the seventies. It seems quite recently that we also greeted the first graduates of higher military-political schools, but eight years of their service in the units already have gone by. A majority of them have become political deputies to battalion commanders and regimental propagandists or are working in political entities of units large and small. There also are deputy regimental commanders and chiefs of unit political entities among them.

Among the many, I recall Lt Anatoliy Abramov. During these years he worked successfully in the positions of deputy company commander and then deputy battalion commander for political affairs, and he completed the Military-Political Academy imeni V. I. Lenin. Today Capt Abramov is successfully continuing his service among the troops. We have many similar examples among the commanders, political workers, engineers and staff officers.

People say in such cases: "He was lucky. The officer got into a good group and the capable hands of commanders and chiefs who were experienced indoctrinators." All this is so. It is of course very important how people in a subunit greet the lieutenant, how they assist him during the important period of development in a new position, and what kind of support in word and deed he is given further on. The pedagogic wisdom and paternal concern of senior commanders will show up here and the effectiveness of the entire system of indoctrination and training of young officers in a unit will tell.

It is generally known that the effectiveness of indoctrination increases significantly when it makes skilled use of the internal and moral forces of the person himself. The fact is that indoctrination and self-indoctrination are a dialectically single process which mutually supplement each other. And it would appear that self-indoctrination of a soldier, let alone of an officer, acquires special importance today.

The example of Capt Abramov is convincing proof of this. In the very first meetings he was remembered by the desire to master the complex scope of the work of a company political officer more quickly, by his inherent creative vein and by his feeling of pride for his profession and for combat service in the National Air Defense Forces. He also was remembered for his definiteness and clarity of his life's purpose, by the openness of his soul and by his nearness to people. All this helped him enter the collective and win high authority more quickly. We had more than one chat and it was always interesting to hear his frank stories of work on himself and of his experience of indoctrination and self-indoctrination.

Unfortunately, there also are examples of young officers' service which take a difficult form. What is the problem here? Take Lt S. Loos, who put on the officer's uniform three years ago. My acquaintance with him began with a letter which arrived in the district political directorate almost a year ago. It stated that this unit showed little concern for seeing that the recent graduate of a military school took his place in formation as quickly as possible. As a result Lt Loos lost interest in service, became noticeably despondent and sought comfort in alcohol more and more often.

The letter breathed of a disturbed, frank alarm for the young officer's fate. Experienced political officers were sent immediately to the unit. They carefully studied how the regiment conducted indoctrination work with young officers. Many shortcomings were uncovered, including in their living arrangements. To the honor of the unit commander, political workers and the party and Komsomol organizations, they took the necessary steps and corrected the state of affairs. The senior comrades began to devote more attention to individual work with Lt Loos as well. Both his immediate commanders and representatives of the superior staff and political entity who arrived specially in the unit held repeated talks with him. It appeared that now things would take an upswing for the officer, but unfortunately something different happened: He committed crude infractions in performance of service one after the other, committed fraud and did not cherish the honor of a Komsomol officer. A measure such as an officers' court of honor had to be applied. Loos also was expelled from the Komsomol.

What led him to such a finale? An extreme lack of exactingness toward himself, lack of desire to struggle against shortcomings in his conduct, lack of self-discipline and a poor sense of duty, including to the collective.

It is not often, but young officers still are encountered who forget that they themselves above all are responsible for their deeds and actions and have to improve their own moral qualities and become tempered spiritually.

Indoctrination is not simply supplemented, but is deepened by self-indoctrination. Only one's own persistent work, merged as one with the concern of commanders, political entities, and party and Komsomol organizations for the development of the officer youth, is capable of bringing success. V. A. Sukhomlinskiy, a notable Soviet pedagogue, wrote: "Indoctrination which leads to self-indoctrination is, according to my profound conviction, real indoctrination."

That is how our best officers proceed--experienced indoctrinators O. Anisimov, P. Razuvayev, I. Dokuchayev, G. Abduragimov and others. They know the value of self-indoctrination, work on it persistently for their entire lives, and generously share the abundant experience with young officers.

Demands on the moral-political, combat and psychological qualities of Soviet officers are increasing from year to year. The Communist Party and Soviet government devote an enormous amount of attention to problems of further improving the training of military cadres and perfecting the training and indoctrination of military personnel. In his book entitled "Na strazhe mira i sotsializma" [On Guard over Peace and Socialism], Comrade L. I. Brezhnev emphasizes that indoctrination of military personnel is a kind of art, and a complex and delicate one, which every officer is obligated to master. Practical implementation of requirements of the CPSU Central Committee Decree "On Further Improvement of Ideological and Political Indoctrination Work" now is one of the most important tasks in the work of commanders, political entities, and party and Komsomol organizations.

The indoctrination of ideologically conditioned officers who are excellently prepared in the professional sense is the focus of attention of the district military council and political directorate. Units make use of the entire diversity of forms and methods of ideological-political, military and moral indoctrination of military cadres. At the same time, we are attaching more and more significance to the self-indoctrination of officers and the ability to conduct it at the level of demands of contemporary military pedagogics and psychology.

Just what is required for success in this matter? It is necessary to have an organized system and qualified assistance to officers, especially young ones, on the part of senior comrades, commanders and supervisors. It is necessary to place reliance on scientific achievements in this field. This work must be begun with cadets of military schools and persistently continued for the entire period of their service among the troops.

It is sometimes assumed that self-indoctrination relates purely to personal aspirations. This is a profound error, since concern for self-improvement and for the officer's high moral make-up and example in everything is far from just his personal affair. It is determined by the importance and complexity of missions which he is entrusted to accomplish and by the interests of combat readiness.

It stands to reason that service itself and the accomplishment of diversified missions indoctrinate an officer. For example, in shaping Marxist-Leninist ideology in subordinates, he at the same time enriches himself and deepens his own political knowledge. In training soldiers and preparing them for severe tests of modern warfare, he also tempers his own character.

But maximum success is achieved if the officer engages in self-indoctrination constantly and in a methodologically competent manner. It must have precise direction. The officer is obligated to reinforce and develop in himself those very qualities which he needs as a professional military person: the deepest devotion to the Motherland and the cause of the Communist Party, allegiance to military duty, discipline, industriousness, a strong will, boldness, persistence, endurance, resourcefulness and a constant desire to increase his knowledge and skills.

Self-indoctrination will be purposeful when a person interprets his own so-called "initial parameters": training level, guidelines in life, and positive qualities; and when he analyzes his deficiencies, primarily those noted in his performance appraisal. How can we not help but recall the advice of N. Ostrovskiy: For self-indoctrination one primarily has to summon himself before his own stern, impartial court.

An officer's entire further work of shaping the necessary qualities in himself will depend on how correctly self-analysis has been performed and how precisely a self-appraisal has been made. A commander or political officer wiser in worldly and service experience can give him effective assistance in this matter. Regular familiarity with innovations of pedagogic literature on problems of self-indoctrination will be of undoubted help to the officer, and our libraries in officers' clubs and servicemen's clubs must display high activeness here.

Self-indoctrination achieves the goal only when it is carried on vigorously, continuously and in a well-conceived manner. It is difficult to count even on the slightest bit of perceptible success if we work on ourselves from occasion to occasion without any kind of system. Of course, the planning of self-indoctrination is a complex, creative and strictly individual matter. Stereotypes are unacceptable here as nowhere else. But the recommendations of military pedagogy and a study of the experience of the best officers in working on themselves provide an opportunity to trace certain principles.

Once an officer confidentially acquainted me with a self-indoctrination plan. Above all, relying on the data of self-analysis and the self-appraisals he had made, he formulated the primary goals of self-indoctrination. Then he determined the basic tasks, means and methods of working on himself.

The plan envisaged a self-indoctrination program as well as the resolution of problems involving the development and improvement of moral-political and professional qualities of an officer. The plan called for a study of the works of classics of Marxism-Leninism, decisions of the 25th CPSU Congress,

party Central Committee decrees, books on military pedagogics and psychology, and references on operational-tactical and special training.

The section of the plan which mentioned the overcoming of specific deficiencies in the officer's character was no less interesting. His honesty and the strict mercilessness with which he appraised himself were worthy of special respect. The officer declared an irreconcilable war against negative traits, qualities and bad habits. And from here he took a direct step to volitional self-mobilization and continuous moral self-control.

The district's foremost units and subunits actively propagandize the experience of the best officers' self-indoctrination and make it a practice to bear their accounts at party committee and party bureau sessions and before Komsomol committees. This also helps uncover the deficiencies which are present and to achieve their elimination. This is a delicate matter which requires tact and respect for a person's inner world and faith in his abilities.

Recently workers of the district political directorate analyzed the work of moral indoctrination of personnel in Unit "X." The study reaffirmed the enormous importance that competition has for moral self-improvement. All service personnel, including officers, make pledges here to develop moral-combat and moral qualities. These matters are the subject of a businesslike analysis when competition results are summarized.

There is nothing worse for self-indoctrination than self-satisfaction. There is a figurative comparison that is very true: While rowing a boat one moves forward, rest just a bit and the current immediately carries you backward. That is how it is in life. An officer must have a healthy inherent sense of dissatisfaction with what has been achieved and the desire to master more and more heights of knowledge in order to give all of himself to the cause for which he serves.

And I would also like to emphasize that we must be more persistent in improving the work of all service personnel on themselves by improving the system of officer self-indoctrination. There are large reserves for indoctrination here as a whole. The high efficiency and overall culture of Soviet military personnel allow us to augment our efforts in accomplishing this important task.

It would appear that the problem of self-indoctrination of military personnel merits greater attention in works by our military scholars--pedagogues and psychologists. We will hope that reference works on the officer's self-indoctrination and on the self-indoctrination of the soldier, for example, soon will appear in the topical plan of the Military Publishing House. The troops await them. Commanders and political workers of our units need practical recommendations and methods instructions which will help them carry out the political, military and moral indoctrination of personnel more effectively and keep in step with heightened demands.

Radar Company Field Training Criticized

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 10 Aug 79 p 2

[Article by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent Col Ye. Babynin: "Effectiveness and Quality are Most Important: But There Is a Subject for Reproach"]

[Text] The senior chief gave the squad of radiotelegraphers a narrative problem: An "enemy" airborne force has landed next to the position. The squad commander was allowed to set forth the order of his actions verbally, but the general repeated the narrative once again and gave to understand that he wanted to see the actions. The NCO commanded: "Form extended line!" and made ready to fire together with his subordinates. But in what way? He himself was lying in a spot where he could be seen from all sides. The other radiotelegraphers also were disposed next to their commander not in the best manner. It was clear that it was the first time they were fighting such a battle.

"Consider that the enemy has mowed you down with one submachinegun burst," said the general.

This episode, which occurred at the range, was recalled when we were chatting with Capt Yu. Bondarev, a radar company commander. We were speaking about how the subunit would repulse the attack of the ground enemy if necessary. The captain pointed out the foxholes located at the four corners of the position. We went up closer to them. No one had looked into them at least since winter. They were overgrown by grass and the walls had caved in in places. Small boards--the squad range cards--were white against the breastworks. They had been drawn up in a very approximate manner, with only the sector indicated and the range to reference points was given with large errors.

"I am always too busy to look into it," explained Capt Bondarev. "It was even last year that we fired submachineguns..."

Of course the radar personnel stand combat watch, service very sophisticated electronic gear, and persistently improve their professional training. The company completed the winter training period successfully. Radar personnel also pledged to complete summer training with a high mark. It is believed that they will keep their word. And against such a background, such a cool attitude toward certain combined-arms disciplines and an underestimation of the soldier's tactical, engineer and fire training appears strange.

It is possible to encounter such a state of affairs in some radar subunits. True, none of the officers here are about to assert that defense against the ground enemy is a secondary matter. The acting commander of one of the companies even boasted that they did not simply dig trenches, but also lined them with synthetic material to keep the walls from caving in. By the way, range cards were not found and the foxholes were not situated very successfully: The enemy could come right up to them under cover and throw grenades.

A check shows formalism. There is allegedly something to show the inspectors. But the foxholes will be occupied by people, and not everything will be favorable when they prepare for battle against the ground enemy. Take Jr Sgt K. Semokaytis, a 1st class radiotelegrapher and an excellent specialist. He loves and knows his job, but there are gaps in his combined-arms training. For example, he could not say what he had to do in case of attack by the ground enemy. The junior sergeant fired a submachinegun in the spring, and there were no further small arms practices. He never once threw a hand grenade, although he saw two practice grenades which the company first sergeant had. Semokaytis listened with interest to a narrative about contemporary tanks and fire support helicopters and about methods for making various obstacles. He admitted that he was hearing much for the first time. But the fact is that he must know all of this and the program provides for appropriate classes in tactical, fire and engineer training.

Jr Sgt Semokaytis is not alone. Pfc M. Fedorchenko, one of the best operators who was released to the reserve in the fall, only performed exercises in firing small arms twice during his service.

Acting company commander Capt A. Privalikhin added that they had a hard time with the shooting gallery. The officers generally had a difficult time firing the pistol. He personally performed the exercise when he served in another unit. "I have not fired for five years," said WO V. Kiranchuk, adding to the officer's words. By the way, he was assigned to locate a diagram of personnel actions in repulsing an attack by the ground enemy, but the warrant officer just could not find it.

This company also stands in good repute. The radar personnel perform combat watch vigilantly, detect air targets in good time and operate successfully under conditions of intensive jamming. But just where did they get the underestimation of self-defense against a possible attack by a force dropped by parachute or against enemy subversive groups?

"Do you think the people do not understand the importance of ground defense?" battalion commander Maj V. Shamray said to me in objection. "We are simply hindered by objective difficulties..."

Yes, they are present. In a number of instances the radar personnel simply have nowhere to fire. And even if the neighbors have a shooting gallery, it is not so simple to agree on its use. "It took me three days to get authorization from the motorized riflemen to go to the range," recalled Maj Shamray. "They finally agreed. And only because an inspection was coming up." This is a complication which should not be, for there exists a chart for use of training fields, rifle ranges and shooting galleries. The needs of radar personnel also should be considered in them.

The problem of training stills on combined-arms training has not been resolved in some radiotechnical subunits. There are not enough manuals, posters and models.

It stands to reason that all these difficulties are fully surmountable. It is not at all mandatory to have a shooting gallery for small arms practices, and it is quite possible to train radar personnel to throw hand grenades in the subunit area: As it turned out, there are mock-ups. As a rule, the officers perform pistol exercises during courses. The fact is, it is not difficult to arrange training in the company as well.

Of course, not so many hours are set aside in the program for training radar specialists for small arms practices or for the study of combined-arms tactics or engineer work. This is understandable, but still, there is time. Experienced commanders who are concerned for the comprehensive training of their subordinates take advantage of every pause in combat work for this purpose, arrange competitions in throwing grenades and in disassembling and assembling the submachinegun, and arrange contests among squads and teams for speed in occupying foxholes. In other words, a kind of incidental training is going on. There is great benefit from it.

In short, it is only necessary to have an understanding of the importance of this matter. Unfortunately, this is what sometimes is lacking. One young officer parried a reproach for poor small arms training of subordinates in this manner:

"The submachinegun is the motorized rifleman's weapon, but we have the magnetron. Motorized riflemen are strong at the firing line, and we are strong in tracking air targets. Why should we be reproached?"

The operator of a radar station, the radiotelegrapher and the diesel operator also have to be able to organize foxholes and shelters and hit the enemy with an accurate round or a decisive toss of a grenade. The fact is that they are not simply technical specialists, but soldiers.

Remote Site Medical Service

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 18 Aug 79 p 2

[Article by Maj Gen Med Serv N. Osipov, chief of military medical service, Red Banner Baku ADD, honored physician of Azerbaijan SSR: "With Our Military Medical Personnel: Over Distant Routes"]

[Text] That evening the commander called the unit physician, Capt Med Serv A. Kulesh and said anxiously:

"Aleksandr Porfir'yevich, Pvt Marchenko is ill. The medical assistant suspects acute appendicitis. Prepare for take-off. I'll arrange the helicopter now."

But they were not successful in taking off quickly. The high mountain garrison where the patient was located was socked in by a dense layer of clouds. The helicopter could not land there.

Officer Kulesh contacted the subunit medical assistant, Sgt V. Baranov, by radio from the command post. He maintained this link throughout the night, asking about the pulse rate, blood pressure and the patient's temperature, and other data. He gave the medical assistant necessary advice and instructions. It was only in the morning that Pvt Marchenko could be delivered to the hospital. The soldier was operated on and he soon resumed his place in combat formation.

Considering the remoteness of air defense subunits from their units' medical stations, medical workers of our district do a great deal to reduce the negative consequences of this feature and reduce to a minimum the situations requiring an urgent summons to a particular remote "site," as was the case in the incident mentioned above. This is reflected specifically in a number of measures. I will mention some of them.

I will begin by saying that unit physicians take an active part in selecting young replacements for performing service in remote areas, especially high mountain areas. Novices are assigned there only after a thorough medical examination. Persons are selected who are capable of becoming acclimated in the new conditions more quickly and who are less subject to various illnesses.

Of course, matters are not limited to this. Also considered is the fact that operators, plotters, communicators and other personnel performing combat watch are at their work areas for a long while and endure much nervous tension, but they hardly experience any physical load. If such disharmony is permitted, it can lead to disruption of the circulatory system and to a weakening in the overall body tone.

Military medical personnel together with officers responsible for physical training and sports have worked out physical exercise complexes for personnel of various specialties. A strict rule has been introduced: A physician who visits a remote garrison is obligated to look into how regularly and with what quality physical training classes are held here, what the personnel's level of physical development is, and to instruct NCO's and privates in self-monitoring of their state of health.

Much attention is given to the selection and training of medical assistants (medical instructors) of remote subunits, especially those at inaccessible "sites." Each of them must have good mastery of the techniques of giving first aid in instances of various injuries, must have good mastery of methods for diagnosing illnesses, and must have a certain amount of clinical practical experience. Courses are held with them twice during every training period. Classes there are conducted by medical personnel of great experience such as Col Med Serv S. Gusev, chief surgeon of the district; Col Med Serv M. Gadzhiev, honored physician of Azerbaijan SSR and chief therapist of the district; and other leading specialists. Such an arrangement ensures a high level of training for the medical assistants.

These measures in combination with much work of illness prevention have produced positive results. There was a drop in the percentage of personnel illnesses and injuries. Instances of a transfer of service personnel from the "sites" because of health have become rarer. But we do not believe that we are completely fulfilling the recommendations aimed at further improvement in medical services expressed at the All-Army Conference on Improving Troop Welfare. There still are many reserves here, and we are attempting to implement them.

Let us again return to the medical assistants and medical instructors. They must be taught not only at courses, but also directly on the spot, and there must be continuous supervision over their work. The chief of the unit's medical service must do this above all, but some of them do not burden themselves by trips to remote subunits, preferring a telephone style of leadership. Such a style is characteristic in particular of Capt Med Serv A. Rymar'. "There is not enough time," he states. Troop physicians really do have many concerns, but no references to the workload can be taken into account when we are speaking of preserving soldiers' health.

The practice under which some medical assistants of remote garrisons are regularly torn from performance of their immediate duties cannot be deemed normal. This shows a lack of understanding of the importance of their functions. As a result, medical enlightenment work is done poorly among the personnel and the medical worker himself loses professional skills.

There are instances of a light attitude taken by some subunit commanders toward classes in military medical training. For example, such classes were not held with the subordinates of Capt A. Veselovskiy during the entire training year. It is no wonder that many personnel of this subunit have no skills in giving first aid.

The soldiers' successes in training and service depend largely on their health. Concern for this is the chief task of medical workers. The closer their coordination with commanders and political workers and the more often that the routes of troop physicians lie to the small garrisons lost among the mountain peaks, the more successfully this task can be resolved.

Disciplinary Practices Criticized

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 24 Aug 79 p 2

[Article by Lt Col Ye. Sklyarov: "Moral Indoctrination: Facing the Truth"]

[Text] For a long while, the state of affairs with training and discipline in this air defense unit caused no concern on the part of senior chiefs. The commander and political deputy more than once reported that they had completely eradicated infractions of military order. The officer managers were praised and set as the example for others. Then suddenly, out of the blue, came one crude infraction of military discipline, and after it another... What was this, a chance happening?

District staff officer Maj A. Lopasteyskiy worked several days in the unit. He checked regulation order and the organization of troop service, and he delved into questions of officers' disciplinary practice. He did not ignore the good and instructive things he saw, but took note of them. But he also uncovered many deficiencies. Two disciplinary infractions were committed during his work in the unit. One of them involved infractions of rules for performing guard service, and the other involved infractions of internal service rules. As the checker noted, it was here that, figuratively speaking, there were holes which negligent soldiers took advantage of without delay.

Maj Lopasteyskiy saw clearly that some officers lacked experience in organizing guard service and in fighting for strict observance of the order of the day. He willingly assisted them and passed on his knowledge and experience. It was another matter with those whose sense of responsibility for the assigned sector was dulled and who attempted to embellish the results achieved and conceal shortcomings. They must be criticized strictly and justly, and some must be required to give a major accounting of themselves.

In summarizing results of the check, Maj Lopasteyskiy stated everything directly and openly to unit officers. He could not help but note the dissatisfaction of some of them in the low grade for their work. The checker was too strict and captious, in their opinion. And later, apparently not as a complaint, but just in passing, they repeated this in a talk with the senior commander who headed the check. The calculation was simple: Perhaps he would not wish to approve the checker's grade and would want him to soften his conclusions.

There is no question that it is very unpleasant when unflattering comments are made about your work, let alone in the presence of the senior chief. But Maj Lopasteyskiy knew that a line of principle is the most correct line and will always gain the upper hand. And he was not wrong. The senior chief looked into everything thoroughly. To Maj Lopasteyskiy's honor, his report was truthful, as was the officer's party conscience, and the grades were objective.

Unfortunately, this cannot be said about those unit officers who prepared a report on disciplinary practice for the senior chief. For example, what motives guided chief of staff Maj A. Kovalev in stating that they had eradicated infractions of military discipline? It would appear that he struck a bargain with his conscience and forgot about party and official responsibility for providing accurate and truthful information about the true state of affairs in his assigned sector of work.

To face the truth, to assess what has been achieved objectively, not to gloss over deficiencies, but to eliminate them persistently is the sign of command maturity and of a person's correct understanding of his duty. The CPSU Central Committee Decree "On Further Improvement of Ideological and Political Indoctrination Work" obligates us to augment the grand traditions

of the Army and Navy, service in which is a remarkable school of labor and military schooling, of moral purity and courage, and of patriotism and comradeship. The moral example of the commander, political worker and staff officer, their moral purity, honesty and principle affect the minds and hearts of their subordinates in the most noble manner and teach them how to perform their military duty with honor and dignity. And such officers who set a genuine example in training, service and conduct represent the overwhelming majority in our units.

But now and then we encounter an officer who attempts to pass off wishes for reality, to conceal a deficiency and to give false reports to a senior chief. While working in Unit "X" not long ago, we decided to have a chat with one of the privates, but subunit commander Capt Ye. Fedorov could not provide an intelligible answer for a long while on just where his subordinate was located. As it later turned out, he simply concealed the truth. And this truth was that the soldier had been detained by patrols for an infraction of military order.

Let us now attempt to understand the psychology of Capt Fedorov's act. There is no question that he was not indifferent to his subordinate's absence without leave, but he very much did not want the district staff representatives to learn about this incident. One has to give an explanation, and then, you see, the senior comrades get the desire to delve more deeply into the organization of indoctrination work and troop service. No, better to keep quiet...

This thought apparently disturbed Capt Fedorov most of all, and this is what prompted him to strike a bargain with his conscience.

Of course, a situation might arise where the circumstances of an infraction and the causes which led up to it still are not fully clear, but even then it is the commander's duty to report truthfully about what happened, explaining that a detailed investigation has not yet been completed. Had Capt Fedorov acted in this manner, his conscience would have remained clear. Unfortunately, the officer did not think about the consequences or the responsibility which he bore.

Even before, there were instances, not only in the subunit, but in the unit as a whole, where the state of military discipline was viewed in two dimensions: one which properly reflected reality, for oneself; and the other, with a clear embellishment of the state of affairs, for senior chiefs. As a result the accounts and reports being sent to higher echelons did not correspond to the truth.

It stands to reason that a strict party assessment was given to attempts at eyewash and instances of a formal approach to indoctrination work. Meanwhile, the reasons for this phenomenon were uncovered and specific measures planned, aimed at eliminating the deficiencies and spreading the working experience of the foremost commanders.

For example, the commander's practice and work experience with young officers of party member Lt Col Yu. Chayko merits attention. His word always is accurate and truthful.

Lt Col Chayko has a sense of principle and is self-critical in assessing the results of his work. In speaking at party meetings, he says less about successes and more about the shortcomings and unresolved problems. He targets the entire collective at even more persistent work and at complete and first-rate performance of operational training missions and competition pledges.

One of his subordinates once committed a serious error in service. It stands to reason that Lt Col Chayko had to explain to the senior chief. No, he did not attempt to find justifiable circumstances.

"I will look into everything in detail with the culprit," declared Lt Col Chayko to the senior chief. "But even now I see that I also did not do everything for training and indoctrination of the officer."

Officers from higher headquarters recently checked the organization of combat training and competition here. They drew good conclusions and the senior chief planned to take note of certain officers in the order. But Lt Col Chayko frankly admitted that it was still a bit early to praise them. They still had not gotten rid of shortcomings in such matters as organizing for combat on the terrain. There was no stability in performing operational training missions and the norms, while weak knowledge in practical and weapons training was noted in Capt Velichko's subordinates. Chayko requested his senior comrades to give assistance in improving the methods training of the young officers.

The general who headed up the commission thanked the officer:

"Your self-critical report will help us analyze the state of affairs more thoroughly, assess what has been achieved more accurately and provide your subordinates with effective assistance."

And that is how it was in fact.

It would appear that now as never before, every officer must engage more often in critical self-analysis of his work and actions and compare them with the strict demands of military regulations and our communist morality.

Shortcomings in Radiotechnical Troops Training

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 26 Aug 79 p 2

[Article by Col M. Zhdanov: "The Commander and Contemporary Warfare: A Narrative Problem was Received"]

[Text] A tactical exercise was underway in the radiotechnical subunit. According to plan, it was to correspond to possible variants of combat operations in the given area.

Air targets were moving from several directions in groups at various altitudes. Under cover of radio jamming, some of them were maneuvering in an attempt to penetrate to the defended installation under cover. But the "enemy's" cunning did not catch the subunit commander, Officer A. Strakhov, and his subordinates unawares. He quickly estimated the situation, made substantiated decisions and made capable use of a reallocation of missions among teams. The commander's confidence also was transmitted to his subordinates. Reports soon began to be received about detection of low-altitude targets. Information on the most important of them was immediately transmitted to the superior command post. All targets were opportunely detected, tracked stably and "destroyed" by weapons on the established lines.

But then a narrative problem was received which was not covered by the exercise plan: to close down the radar station and make a march to a new area for accomplishing a mission which had arisen suddenly. And here it was learned that the team headed by WO N. Boyko was not prepared for this. The time spent in performing the mission considerably surpassed the established norms.

A subsequent analysis allowed an identification of the reasons for the radar operators' failure. The subunit had taken a one-sided approach to organizing the specialists' combat training. In particular, little attention was given to shaping practical skills when the teams worked elements of field training.

There is no question that the role of the operator, who is the central figure of the radiotechnical subunit, now has increased significantly. But we cannot be carried away in his training only by specialized practice to the detriment of other disciplines, as happens in some subunits. In addition to precise work at the scope, an operator must have sufficient skills in tearing down and setting up equipment and in performing combat work at an unfamiliar position. He must be excellently prepared physically and must skillfully master the individual weapon.

Soldiers' readiness to act expertly in combat shows up graphically in tactical exercises. For this reason it is very important for every exercise to approximate combat reality to the maximum and contribute to the greatest extent in increasing radar operators' military expertise.

Unfortunately, it is not yet all commanders who follow this rule, which has been tested by many years of practice. For example, what experience could personnel of the subunit commanded by Maj S. Detochenko receive if, in pursuit of a high grade, they had closed down the radars and prepared for the march ahead of time? The time "saved" in this manner permitted the teams to begin performing the mission in a new area "ahead of schedule." Nevertheless, this ruse did not help conceal omissions in their training. In the process of combat work it turned out that the equipment was not sufficiently provided with spare gear, and it had to be delivered to the position. In addition, the terrain survey was not performed quite accurately, and coordinates of the detected targets were issued with mistakes.

A specific character of the radiotechnical troops is an isolated location of subunits at a considerable distance from each other and from the unit headquarters. Therefore, under conditions of contemporary warfare, when centralized control may be disrupted, the subunit commander must be capable of making independent decisions, including for carrying out a maneuver.

Experience shows that changing positions is no simple matter. It requires detailed knowledge and firm practical skills of team commanders and all personnel. This is so not only in taking down equipment and organizing and conducting the march, but also in making use of the tactics of combined-arms warfare.

Radiotechnical subunits will make wide use of a maneuver over considerable distances in actual warfare when there is a change in combat missions and also for the purpose of moving out from under enemy strikes. Success here is achieved by leaving and occupying positions in minimum time periods, by swiftness of the march and by concealment--changing positions at night or under conditions of limited visibility and observing camouflage measures.

We should emphasize the importance of taking advantage of hours of darkness to achieve assigned missions. But the advantages of night maneuvers are achieved only on condition of exceptional precision, well-conceived organization to the fine points, and faultless schooling of the teams.

The basis of decisionmaking for a maneuver consists of foresight, a sober calculation of the correlation of forces and weapons, and the commander's high professional expertise. Of course, there always is an element of risk here as well. The commander's mission is to reduce this risk to a minimum, think through and prepare the march carefully, accomplish it swiftly and unexpectedly for the enemy, and thus lead him astray. That is just how subunit commander Officer I. Koshel'kov acts. In every practice he creates something new and unusual for his subordinates; that which they might encounter in actual combat.

The subunit gives much attention to field training and to increasing the teams' maneuver capabilities. The closing down and deploying of equipment is done in strict conformity with instructions under the immediate direction of team commanders. During marches they practice the procedure of actions in an attack by the air or ground enemy, column movement of demolished sectors of roads and contaminated terrain, and performance of personnel decontamination and gas and radioactive decontamination of equipment. During movement the teams are constantly ready for immediate deployment, for which possible positions are planned ahead of time along the route.

In the last tactical exercise the subunit waged an intensive battle against the air "enemy" for several hours. Suddenly an order came to redeploy to another position. The radar operators had to carry out an extensive complex of activities in a short period of time, and the subunit's personnel were up to it. The equipment was placed in a traveling position in record time.

On reaching the designated area, the radar operators began deploying combat equipment from the move. Good preliminary preparations allowed the teams to surpass the norms and begin performing the assigned mission ahead of schedule. In attempting to penetrate to the defended objective at low altitude, the air "enemy" was detected opportunely and "destroyed" by the weapons.

As practical experience shows, making a march is the most difficult element in radio operators' field training. In preparing for it, it is necessary to perform a comprehensive appraisal of the nature of the terrain, condition of the soil and trafficability of roads and bridges, especially during the winter-spring period. Account also should be taken of possible changes in the weather, which may considerably complicate mission performance.

Heightened demands on the radio operators' professional training dictate the need to introduce new, more improved forms and methods of combat training. Great effect is obtained by introducing into practice the working of individual elements of field training in the form of special exercises: deployment and closing down of equipment, making a march, maneuvering repair resources, restoring disabled weapons and communications facilities, repulsing an attack by the ground or air enemy, personnel actions on contaminated terrain and so on. Experience has been gained in integrating tactical exercises: a simultaneous working of many sections of tactical, special and small arms training and problems of logistical and combat support.

Training points play a large part in accomplishing the task of improving the field training and the maneuver capabilities of radiotechnical subunits. Their importance increases each year and goes beyond the framework of individual specialist training. Foremost units train teams at the UTP [training points] to perform the entire complex of combat missions. Such practices permit the personnel to reinforce practical skills and accustom them to act coolly in the most difficult situations.

It is not precluded that a situation may arise during actual combat where radar operators not only will have to function at the displays and plotting boards, but also defend the position they occupy with weapons in hand. The defense will be conducted by limited forces, inasmuch as responsibility for performing the primary mission--detecting and tracking air targets--is not removed from the radiotechnical subunits under any conditions. For this reason the privates, NCO's, warrant officers and officers must be ready to fight in a situation requiring a rapid shift from one form of action to another.

Unfortunately these issues escape the field of view of some commanders. During a practice the team headed by Officer V. Simakov was assigned the mission of repulsing an "enemy" landing force. The radar operators did not act in the best manner and made crude mistakes in using the techniques of combined-arms warfare. And in classification firing with personal weapons conducted immediately after the practice, the subunit received only a satisfactory grade.

The level of the personnel's field training depends largely on the training of commanders of the radiotechnical units and on how purposefully they prepare the subunits for confident actions in a near-real combat situation. This level is determined by the directors' ability to create a complex and instructive situation in problems, to take advantage of foremost techniques in training subordinates, and to arrange effective socialist competition. Their personal participation in elaborating the concepts of tactical exercises and their immediate training of subunit commanders during practices and exercises which preclude any indulgences or oversimplification are of special significance here.

The readiness of radiotechnical subunits to perform missions under difficult conditions is assured by the entire system of combat training, where a leading place belongs to tactical training. Life insistently indicates a need for further improvement in the field training of teams and subunits and for making it conform precisely with the demands of contemporary warfare. An objective approach to results achieved and a struggle for effectiveness in classes, practice sessions and tactical exercises will help in further elevating the combat readiness of radiotechnical subunits and assure their unconditional performance of assigned missions.

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CRITICISMS AND COMPLAINTS: FOLLOW-UP REPORTS

Measures on Housing Deficiencies

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 1 Aug 79 p 2

[Article: "Following KRASNAYA ZVEZDA Coverage: 'Complaints Go to the Billeting Directorate'"]

[Text] A report by Lieutenant Colonel Yu. Teplov published under this heading on 29 June of this year touched upon questions of low-quality construction and the unsatisfactory maintenance of some residential buildings in the Transcaucasus Military District.

As reported to the editors by the member of the military council and chief of the district's political directorate, Lieutenant General A. Overchuk, the report was discussed with supervisory personnel of the KEU [billetting directorate] of the district and the KECh [billetting unit] of the Tbilisskiy rayon as well as at a session of the KEU's primary party organization bureau.

Practical measures have been outlined for the preparation of housing for winter. A planning schedule for the preparation of the garrison housing for winter has been approved. In accordance with this plan, in particular, work on the repair and good organization of public services and amenities in the housing mentioned in the report will be completed in September 1979.

For the tardy adoption of measures in response to the letters and complaints of the tenants, officials of the district KEU, KECh, and the housing administration of the Tbilisskiy rayon received strict warnings and administrative punishment.

Siberian MD Military Press Criticized

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 2 Aug 79 p 2

[Article: "Following KRASNAYA ZVEZDA Coverage: 'Dressing on the Right Guides'"]

[Text] A press survey was published under this heading in KRASNAYA ZVEZDA on 10 July. It analyzed the work of the editorial staff of the Red Banner Siberian Military District newspaper, SOVETSKIY VOIN, in generalizing, propagandizing, and introducing into troop practice leading experience in the training and indoctrination of personnel and the organization of socialist competition.

As reported by the editor in chief of SOVETSKIY VOIN, Colonel B. Chistov, the press survey was discussed at a session of the editorial board and a short editorial meeting. An objective discussion of the critical remarks addressed to the newspaper SOVETSKIY VOIN in the press survey took place at a party meeting.

Measures are being adopted to eliminate shortcomings. Adjustments have been introduced in long-range and current plans. New columns have been introduced: "Tribune of Leading Experience" and "Leading Experience--For All." The frequency of publication has been regularized and demandingness toward the content and form for submitting materials has been increased.

Ship's Captain Relieved of Command

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 3 Aug 79 p 2

[Article: "Following KRASNAYA ZVEZDA Coverage: 'In the Gap'"]

[Text] The report of Captain 2d Rank A. Zlydnev, which was published under this heading on 5 June of this year, told about shortcomings in the organization of combat training and socialist competition on one of the ships of the Red Banner Pacific Fleet.

As reported to the editors by the political officer, Captain 2d Rank A. Karlin, the facts indicated in the report actually took place. For dereliction of duty and a personal lack of discipline, Captain-Lieutenant V. Belov was relieved of his post as ship's commander and reassigned with a demotion. The party organization reprimanded him with an entry in his registration card. The ship's deputy commander for political affairs, Senior Lieutenant S. Loktionov, was also relieved of his post. A party meeting relieved Captain-Lieutenant S. Kozlov of his duties as secretary of the party organization.

In publishing this response, the editors were forced to recall that the report "In the Gap" made a detailed analysis of shortcomings in the work style of the subunit commander and staff officers who knew of the state of affairs

on the backward ship but did not undertake timely measures for their improvement. And it is reasonable to ask: why didn't the reply to the editors tell about which measures were adopted in accordance with this part of the newspaper's article?

Communists in GSFG Criticized

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 4 Aug 79 p 2

[Article: "Following KRASNAYA ZVEZDA Coverage: 'In Spite of their Own Words'"]

[Text] A report by Colonel V. Nagernyy published under this heading on 13 June discussed the unscrupulousness of some communists and incomplete work in indoctrinal activity of the headquarters party organization and unit party committee.

The editors received a reply from the first deputy chief of the political directorate, Group of Soviet Forces in Germany, Major General G. Gromov, and the chief of the large unit's political section. The report was discussed in the political section with commanders and political officers of the large unit and at a session of the party committee of the unit which was discussed in the report.

The behavior of the communists who signed the "refutation" in favor of Navolotskiy was examined at a party meeting in the unit headquarters. They condemned their action. The previous edition of the performance rating was approved for officer Navolotskiy. The party commission with the political section of the large unit reprimanded him with an entry in his registration card.

Post Exchange Service to be Improved

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 4 Aug 79 p 2

[Article: "Following KRASNAYA ZVEZDA Coverage: 'Must One Trade Like This?'"]

[Text] This question was asked of the trade organizers in one of the garrisons of the Moscow Military District by readers S. Latysheva and V. Kopaneva. Their letter about violation of trade rules and low style in servicing customers was published on 11 July.

As reported to the editors by officers P. Kovalev and V. Gorshenev and the chief of the post exchange, M. Kotenkov, the question of improving trade in the garrison was examined at a conference of trade enterprise directors and at meetings in the labor collectives. Control by the public has been intensified. The sale of vegetables and fruits has been organized in store No 9. Poor monitoring of the operation of the officers coffee shop has been pointed out to the chief of the public catering department of the post exchange, A. Krivtsova. For violation of the rules of trade and refusal to give the

complaint book to customers on the first demand, the coffee shop manager, T. Pogodayeva, has been deprived of her bonus for the next month and was reprimanded in an order of the post exchange chief.

Check Point Operations to be Improved

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 4 Aug 79 p 2

[Article: "Following KRASNAYA ZVEZDA Coverage: 'Personal Entrance'"]

[Text] As reported to the editors by the chief of staff of the Baltic Fleet, Vice Admiral A. Kalinin, the report by Captain 1st Rank N. Remizov, "Personal Entrance," which was published on 4 July was discussed in the fleet headquarters and political directorate as well as in force headquarters. Measures have been adopted to eliminate shortcomings in organizing the conditions for leaving on pass. Force commanders have defined in detail the procedure for the passage of servicemen, workers, and employees through the check points and entrances in accordance with the requirements of the regulation.

Red Tape Unraveled in Odessa MD

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 8 Aug 79 p 2

[Article: "Following KRASNAYA ZVEZDA Coverage: 'Mental Deafness'"]

[Text] This was the title of a letter from Major N. Makovskiy with commentary by our correspondent which was published on 3 July. It discussed the red tape in awarding a decoration to a veteran of the Great Patriotic War which was tolerated by the personnel of the Baltskiy rayon military commissariat.

The editors received two replies. One was from the Main Personnel Directorate of the Soviet Ministry Defense and signed by Lieutenant General O. Kupriyanov. The other was from the Odesskaya oblast military commissariat. They reported on measures adopted after the newspaper's article was published.

An order of the Odesskaya oblast military commissar to the Baltskiy rayon military commissar, Lieutenant Colonel V. Pokhnatyuk, announced a strict reprimand. Major Yu. Yeliseyev was warned about incomplete service compliance. The newspaper's article was discussed at a conference of city and rayon commissars, section chiefs, and secretaries of oblast military commissariat party organizations.

The party organization examined the personal files of the communists who tolerated callousness and red tape. Lieutenant Colonel V. Pokhnatyuk received a reprimand with an entry in his registration card while Major Yu. Yeliseyev received a strict reprimand with an entry in his registration card.

Measures To Stop Poaching

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 9 Aug 79 p 2

[Article: "Following KRASNAYA ZVEZDA Coverage: 'Again About Poachers'"]

[Text] A report was published in KRASNAYA ZVEZDA under this heading on 4 April 1979. It called attention to instances of poaching and the unhappy state of affairs in the council of the military hunting society [VOO] of the Volga Military District.

As reported to the editors by the deputy district commander for combat training, Lieutenant General P. Malyakshin, and the secretary of the party commission with the political directorate of the Volga Military District, Colonel M. Morozov, for participating in poaching the former chairman of the district's VOO council, Lieutenant Colonel V. Tanasyuk, has been released to the reserve and the assistant manager of this same council, M. Shchepanovich, has been discharged. G. Gnutov and other participants in poaching received strict administrative punishment. They have all been fined the sum of approximately 600 rubles and, by decision of the presidium of the district VOO, have been deprived of the right to hunt for a period of one year. Measures have been adopted to strengthen the leadership of the district VOO council and a number of hunting facilities with authoritative, conscientious personnel. A new VOO presidium was elected at a district conference. Assemblies of chairmen of garrison councils and chiefs of the district's hunting facilities have been conducted to make the work of the district's VOO council more active.

Construction Delays Eliminated

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 14 Aug 79 p 2

[Article: "Following KRASNAYA ZVEZDA Coverage: 'Extended Break'"]

[Text] This was the title of the note by Captain L. Tonin which was published on 21 June 1979. It criticized shortcomings in the work of the builders of the UNR [work supervisor's section] led by Engineer-Lieutenant Colonel M. Belov who "froze" the construction of a number of objects on one of the military posts.

As reported to the editors by Engineer-Colonel E. Rabinovich and Colonel P. Dolgov, the note was discussed at an enlarged session of the UNR party committee. The impermissibility of dragging out work on objects was strictly pointed out to Communist M. Belov. Construction of the structures has been renewed. A construction schedule has been worked out and approved. A bath house and auxiliary premises will be turned over for operation in August-October. It is planned to put the remaining objects into operation in 1980.

Party Response To Be Improved

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 16 Aug 79 p 2

[Article: "Following KRASNAYA ZVEZDA Coverage: 'In the Role of a Stepson'"]

[Text] The library in one of the garrisons of the Red Banner Pacific Fleet found itself in such a role. It was located in the comfortless vicinity of the bath house, which had a pernicious effect on the storage of books. This was discussed in the remark by Captain 2d Rank A. Zlydnev which was published in our newspaper on 12 May. Despite repeated reminders from the editors, the corresponding officials did not react to the critical article in the newspaper for a long time, and they subsequently got off with answers which were written for form only.

As reported by the first deputy chief of the fleet's political directorate, Rear Admiral D. Shigayev, the question of intensifying the monitoring of timely reaction to critical articles in the press by political organs was examined in the political directorate. The shortcomings which were permitted were indicated to Lieutenant Colonel L. Volesov who is responsible for the operation of the library. A document which requires improvement in work with letters, applications, and complaints of servicemen has been sent to the political organs. Those specifically guilty of procrastination in replying to the editors have been punished. Because of the absence of other premises in the garrison, the library has been moved temporarily to a residential building. The construction of a club in the garrison is planned.

Tailor Work To Be Checked More Closely

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 16 Aug 79 p 2

[Article: "Following KRASNAYA ZVEZDA Coverage: 'That's How They Served'"]

[Text] In answering the letter of Senior Lieutenant A. Vorob'yev which was published on 18 July, the deputy chief of the post exchange directorate of the Moscow garrison, I. Chernushchenko, acknowledges that the sewing of the uniform for officer Comrade Vorob'yev for a year and a half in the branch of tailor shop No 3 actually occurred. The newspaper's article was discussed by the directorate's party-management activists, at a conference of supervisory personnel of production enterprises, and in the tailor shop collective. Monitoring the work of the tailor shop has been intensified. Senior section foreman Yu. Shirokov and shift foreperson A. Ivanova have been deprived of their bonuses for a month.

Military School Entrance Eased

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 18 Aug 79 p 2

[Article: "Following KRASNAYA ZVEZDA Coverage: 'A Dream Remained a Dream....'"]

[Text] A letter by Extended-Service Junior Sergeant M. Tyulenev was published under this heading on 2 August. The letter discussed the author's attempt to enter a military school and the obstacles which he encountered along the way.

As reported to the editors by the first deputy chief of the Main Personnel Directorate of the Soviet Ministry of Defense, Colonel General V. Goncharov, the decision was made to enroll Extended-Service Junior Sergeant Tyulenev in the first course of the Ryzan' Higher Military Command Communications School imeni Marshal of the Soviet Union M. V. Zakharov.

The chief of the personnel directorate of the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany has been given instructions once again to study, together with all the officers of the personnel organs, the guiding documents which define the procedure for selecting candidates for military educational institutions and to demand a party approach to this important work from them.

Military Commissars Urged to be More Courteous

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 19 Aug 79 p 2

[Article: "Following KRASNAYA ZVEZDA Coverage: 'They Don't Even Wish You a Good Day'"]

[Text] In a letter to the editors published under this heading on 20 July, the female war veteran Major of Medical Service (Retired) A. Murycheva expressed her chagrin in connection with the fact that it is necessary to turn to the Balashikha combined military commissariat several times with some question and, really, the veteran who goes there with a request is not always greeted courteously.

As reported to the editors by Colonel A. Mitrofanov who, until recently was acting military commissar of the Moskovskaya oblast, the necessity to have a more attentive attitude toward the requests of citizens, especially front-line veterans, has been strictly pointed out to the military commissar, Colonel Feofanov. The newspaper article was discussed by the party bureau and a party meeting of the oblast military commissariat as well as at a conference of military commissars of Moskovskaya oblast. It was recommended to all military commissars that, together with local authorities, they look for opportunities to wish frontline veterans a good day. (There are 230,000 of them in the oblast). A letter has been sent to the chairman of the Balashikha city soviet with the request to move A. Murycheva to an apartment on the second floor and organize the delivery of food to her home.

Action Taken to Eliminate Red Tape

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 21 Aug 79 p 2

[Article: "Measures Taken on Readers' Signals"]

[Text] Officer V. Dymchishin wrote to KRASNAYA ZVEZDA that when his wife transferred to other work their child was excluded from kindergarten.

The deputy chief of the Central Archives of the Soviet Ministry of Defense for political affairs, Major M. Teterin, has informed the editors that V. Dymchishin's child has been placed in kindergarten No 39, city of Podol'sk.

Reader M. Tarasenko reported to the editors that when he was released to the reserve he was not given a certificate for privileges. The letter was sent to the senior commander.

The reply by Lieutenant General V. Zaytsev states that the certificate has been issued to M. Tarasenko.

Ye. Zhuravlev, a veteran of the Great Patriotic War, has written about red tape in awarding a certificate.

The Rostovskaya oblast military commissar, Major General A. Shal'nov, to whom the letter was sent, reported that Ye. Zhuravlev has been issued the certificate.

Reader A. Puzanov complained that the troop unit is holding up the dispatch of the references on his son, Private (Reserve) V. Puzanov, which are necessary for him to go to work. The first deputy chief of the political directorate of the Baku Air Defense District, Major General V. Mukhortov, has reported that the references-recommendation have been sent to V. Puzanov.

Tourist Bases to be Improved

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 24 Aug 79 p 2

[Article: "Following KRASNAYA ZVEZDA Coverage: 'Tourist Summer'"]

[Text] This was the title of the editorial published this 3 June which raised the problems of developing tourism in the Armed Forces and disclosed shortcomings in the work of individual tourist bases.

As reported to the editors by the deputy commander of the Red Banner Turkestan Military District for rear services and chief of the district's rear services, Major General A. Agudov, the editorial was discussed in the headquarters of the district's rear services and at the "Turkestan" tourist base to whom critical remarks were correctly addressed. Measures have now been adopted to improve conditions for the active rest of tourists. The base has been moved to new premises.

The deputy commander of the Red Banner Kiev Military District for rear services and district chief of rear services, Lieutenant General Ye. Kagerukhin, reported that the editorial, "Tourist Summer," was studied with all coworkers of the district tourism department and the "Kichkine" tourist base. To eliminate shortcomings which are present and improve the status of tourist work in the district, a plan of measures has been drawn up which has been made available to the executors. Monitoring of the plan's implementation has been established.

A reply has also been received from the chief of the construction directorate of the Order of Lenin Leningrad Military District, Engineer-Colonel I. Nikulin, which reports on measures being adopted for the rebuilding of the "Razliv" tourist base.

Naval Officer Removed From Post

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 25 Aug 79 p 2

[Article: "Following KRASNAYA ZVEZDA Coverage: 'In the Gap'"]

[Text] As reported to the editors by Rear Admiral V. Luk'yanov, the report "In the Gap" published in the newspaper on 5 June was discussed at a party meeting in the headquarters and at a seminar of political officers. The criticism of shortcomings in the organization of training and competition has been adjudged as correct. Officer Yu. Savel'yev has been removed from his post and reassigned with a demotion. He was made answerable to the party: he was given a strict reprimand with an entry in his registration card. Measures are being adopted to improve the work of staff officers on ships, raise the quality of combat training, and strengthen military order. Demonstration exercises on the procedure for working out a course problem have been conducted. On the basis of the two best ships, an exchange of experiences in organizing training and competition on a long cruise took place.

Support of Daily Needs To Be Improved

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 25 Aug 79 p 2

[Article: "Following KRASNAYA ZVEZDA Coverage: 'Worldly Matters'"]

[Text] This was the title of the report by Major G. Barnev which was published in KRASNAYA ZVEZDA on 22 July. In it, several communist-leaders were criticized for an indifferent attitude toward the everyday needs of the garrison's residents. As reported to the editors by Colonel A. Shakhunov, the newspaper's article was discussed at a conference in the political organ and at a session of the party bureau where Captain A. Panteleyev is secretary. The criticism was acknowledged as correct. Major V. Davidyuk was heard in the political section and shortcomings in work were pointed out to him. Specific measures have been outlined to ensure the effective reaction to suggestions, complaints, and applications which reach the unit.

A bus has now been allocated for daily service with the railroad station. Days for receiving members of families of servicemen, workers, and employees of the Soviet Army by physician specialists have been coordinated with the management of the city polyclinic. A combined reception point of the post exchange trade and domestic services combine, a new school, and residential building are being prepared for opening. A road to the main highway is under construction. Measures are being adopted to improve cultural leisure time.

Baltic MD Housing Flaws Eliminated

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 25 Aug 79 p 2

[Article: "Following KRASNAYA ZVEZDA Coverage: 'Irresponsibility'"]

[Text] A critical report by Major V. Knyazev was published under this heading on 13 July. As reported by the first deputy commander of the Baltic Military District, Lieutenant General A. Ivanov, those guilty of imperfections in the houses erected by collectives led by Engineer-Colonel M. Agranot and Engineer-Lieutenant Colonel A. Tsirulik have received disciplinary punishment and made answerable to the party. The imperfections have been eliminated. The gas has been connected. Hot water will be fed to the houses after completion of prescribed seasonal work at city TETs-2 [heat and power plant].

Candidate Selection for Schools Improved

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 30 Aug 79 p 2

[Article: "Following KRASNAYA ZVEZDA Coverage: 'If Only They Reported'"]

[Text] A critical report by Major A. Khorunzhii was published under this heading on 20 June. It discussed serious shortcomings which occurred in the Northern Group of Forces [SGV] in selecting candidates from among the active service sergeants and soldiers for entry into the military educational institutions.

As reported to the editors by Lieutenant General S. Bondarev, the newspaper's article was discussed at a conference of officers of the headquarters directorate. By order of the commander of the SGV, disciplinary punishment has been imposed on Lieutenant Colonel V. Vitkovskiy, Lieutenant Colonel V. Mozgovyy, and Major A. Gavrilenko for a formal approach to the selection of candidates for military educational institutions and the poor organization of assemblies with them.

Measures have been outlined which are directed toward eliminating shortcomings in the work of selecting candidates for military educational institutions from among the servicemen.

Air Squadron Competition To Be Renewed

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 30 Aug 79 p 2

[Article: "Following KRASNAYA ZVEZDA Coverage: 'And Alongside--the Lagers'"]

[Text] A report by Engineer-Lieutenant O. Pozhigin was published under this heading in our newspaper on 29 June of this year. It presented facts concerning the unsatisfactory organization of competition among the aviation specialists of the squadron and an inattentive attitude toward the exchange of leading experience.

As reported to the editors by the first deputy chief of the political section for aviation of the Red Banner Carpathian Military District, Colonel V. Yel'chaninov, the newspaper article was discussed at a session of the squadron's party bureau. A number of measures have been outlined for a fundamental improvement in the organization of competition among the technical-engineering personnel. Problems in ensuring the broad publicity of the competition and the introduction of leading experience into the aviators' work practice became the subject of a discussion at a seminar of secretaries of the unit's party organizations.

Now, with the aid of aviation equipment servicing masters, officers V. Komarov and V. Shapovalov and Warrant Officer [praporshchik] V. Uspenskiy have improved indices in combat training significantly and emerged among the leading specialists. The airplanes assigned to these technicians have become outstanding.

GSFC Dormitories To Be Improved

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 31 Aug 79 p 2

[Article: "Following KRASNAYA ZVEZDA Coverage: 'Dormitory Without a Landlord'"]

[Text] A report by Colonel V. Nagornyy which was published under this heading on 1 July discussed shortcomings in organizing the living conditions for young officers of one of the units in the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany [GSFG].

The first deputy chief of the GSFG political directorate, Major General G. Gromov, has reported that the dormitory has been repaired, a day room, dryer, and shower have been installed in it, and the furniture has been replaced. The heating line will receive a major overhaul prior to the start of the heating season. The unit commander and his political deputy have been punished by the commander of the GSFG for an unsatisfactory attitude toward the living conditions of the young officers and warrant officers [praporshchik] and the lack of proper monitoring of the dormitory's maintenance.

The editors also received a reply from the chief of the large unit's political section. He reported on the specific measures for maintaining order in all dormitories of the large unit and of participation in this work by commanders, political officers, party and Komsomol organizations, and the officers and warrant officers themselves who reside in the dormitories.

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PERSONNEL: IMPROPER DISCIPLINARY PROCEDURES CRITICIZED

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 11 Aug 79 p 2

[Letter by reader and comment by Lt Col V. Shchekotov: "First Strictness, Then Indulgence"]

[Text] "Dear Editors:

I am writing you about the following matter. In our flight support unit there have been numerous cases where violations of discipline by certain soldiers have gone unpunished. There have even been instances where service cards have been exchanged and resigned depending on who a person wanted to 'appear as.'

"Perhaps that is why some people form the impression that strict actions play no part. Indulgence in the service only harms the work. How can the following case, for example, be fitted with regulation requirements?

"I recently met Pvt A. Trukhanov, a soldier in our company, far away from the airfield, and it was at a time when he was supposed to be working on his searchlight vehicle. I asked him what he was doing there and he answered that he was helping build a non-professional automotive garage for Maj V. Smelov, unit chief of staff. And it was immediately apparent that it was not his first day working there.

WO [Praporshchik] I. Tsybenko"

During my visit to the aviation technical unit I talked with a number of men. I became increasingly convinced that WO I. Tsybenko had not exaggerated; everything he wrote to the editors was true. I must admit that my first talk with Maj V. Smelov was somewhat puzzling. He quickly switched the talk from shortcomings in disciplinary practices to another subject. "Who do you believe?" he asked heatedly, waving Warrant Officer Tsybenko's service card. Tsybenko himself, he said, had been in disciplinary trouble.

There was a second conversation with Comrade Smelov later. But that was already the second day. The point was that the entries concerning punishments imposed in the service card of the company first sergeant looked very "fresh" to me. What did the situation turn out to be? It turned out that the chief of staff had quickly replaced the last page of Warrant Officer Tsybenko's service card and copied it over himself, changing the color of the ink "just in case." When I asked why he had done this, Officer Smelov, in confusion, made the excuse that some grammatical mistakes had sneaked into the earlier records.

For the sake of objectivity it must be said that WO I. Tsybenko has made mistakes in the service. He should certainly be held responsible for this. Strictly, but fairly.

Does Major Smelov know this? Of course he does. But what is he doing? As an example, he instructed the warrant officer that the floor in the sleeping room of the barracks had to be repaired by a certain time. And he warned him, "If you do not do it I will punish you." But where could the needed materials be found? One would expect Smelov himself to take care of this first of all. But he acted as though this did not concern him at all. Then later, when the company first sergeant could not carry out the order, he punished him.

So we see that an unfounded punishment does not achieve its goal as a measure of influence; it only causes the subordinate to feel dissatisfaction and hurt.

Another sign of problems with disciplinary practices is the fact that certain officers do not follow principle in determining the measure of punishment. They are absolutely strict with one soldier, but soft on another. The service card of WO L. Naymushin says that he has been given two reprimands. The second came three days after the first. The wording was exactly the same, a careless attitude toward service duties. Incidentally, this does not exactly say how this carelessness showed itself. Moreover, exactly half a month later this same Naymushin was awarded a valuable gift "for successes achieved in combat and political training and excellent performance of obligations in competition." What does this mean?

The regulations prescribe clearly and definitely that a punishment imposed at an earlier time may be erased if it has played its educational role, that is, if the person has corrected himself and is performing his military duty in an exemplary fashion. But in this case it seems they did not even notice that the warrant officer had two penalties on his record; despite this he was rewarded with a valuable gift.

The unit also fails to notice that indoctrination work with the men is being done poorly in certain subunits, and that certain officers, among them Major Smelov, are very generous with favors, especially for those subordinates who are being taken off their regular jobs to build private garages, both on working days and days off. This is the source of

shortcomings in disciplinary practices and violations of the regulations in the subunit where Warrant Officer Tsybenko serves.

However, this same subunit, and even more the unit itself, has many examples of a zealous attitude toward the service and heroic military labor. They have demanding, experienced commanders whose subordinates are distinguished by high military discipline and good professional skills. The men of the platoon commanded by Sr Lt V. Boldyrev and the group headed by Capt A. Parushinov are performing their assigned missions in the summer training period well, striving hard for new successes in combat training and competition.

At the same time, it is obvious that the unit is far from doing all it could to eliminate existing shortcomings.

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ACCOMPLISHMENTS OF MILITARY CONSTRUCTION UNITS NOTED

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 12 Aug 79 p 2

[Article by Col Gen-Engr N. F. Shestopalov, deputy USSR minister of defense in charge of construction and troop quartering: "Toward New Goals"]

[Text] Today the Soviet people and their fighting men are celebrating Construction Worker Day. Our Motherland, which is like an enormous construction site, is paying tribute to those who by their heroic labor are strengthening our country, building housing and industrial enterprises, laying transportation routes and petroleum and gas pipelines, and erecting schools, hospitals, children's institutions, cultural centers, and stadiums.

The soccer and track and field complex of the TsSKA [Central Army Sports Club] is the pride of military construction workers. This structure, built for the 1980 Olympics, was recently the site of very successful events as part of the competition in the 7th Summer Spartakiad of the USSR peoples. Everyone from participants in the Spartakiad and judges to foreign guests and the crowds liked the architecture of this structure, which is unique in its class in the USSR and Europe.

Our remarkable cadres of command, engineering-technical, and political personnel promote the successful work of military builders. Many construction site heads, engineers, technicians, and workers have received the lofty title Hero of Socialist Labor, orders and medals, Lenin and State Prizes, prizes of the Leninist Komsomol, and the title "Honored Construction Worker" in the Union republics.

The Communist Party and Soviet Government value the labor of military construction workers highly. Many construction organizations have received orders. The construction directorates of the Carpathian Military District and the Pacific Ocean Fleet and the collectives headed by communist comrades G. Glazunov, A. Gorovatskiy, and V. Deyneko have firm holds on the challenge Red Banners of the CPSU Central Committee, the USSR Council of Ministers, the AUCCTU, and Komsomol Central Committee.

The initiators of the all-Army competition among military construction workers for 1979, the collectives of the Transbaikal and Kiev military

districts, have improved the results of their work. They have significantly exceeded their achievements of last year. The construction directorates of the Belorussian and Far Eastern military districts as well as the labor collective headed by colonel-engineers V. Dukhin, V. Plisko, and Yu. Ovchinnikov have consistently good production and economic indexes.

For military construction units the years of the current five-year plan have been a period of intensive development of their own construction base. Modern industrial enterprises with highly productive equipment have been built in many districts and fleets and a number of plants are undergoing modernization. This has made it possible to significantly raise the degree of prefabrication of construction design elements and industrialization of production, which leads to an improvement in the quality of objects built and a shortening of construction time.

In celebrating their professional holiday military construction workers, following the demands of the 25th CPSU Congress, are making a critical party-minded evaluation of their achievements. The subject today is above all raising the efficiency and quality of construction by maximum use of internal reserves. Our economic indexes have improved somewhat this year; the profitability of military construction organizations has risen and unproductive expenditures have been reduced. However, because of poor organization of work and inefficient use of labor and material-technical resources, some construction collectives are not fulfilling their assignments for raising labor productivity, which has a negative effect on construction times and construction economy. It is omissions in this important work that prevent the construction workers of the Ural and Baltic military districts and the construction organizations headed by colonel-engineers M. Aaman and V. Orekhov from working smoothly and profitably and taking their place among the leaders.

Reducing the prime cost of construction and installation work is the key index of economic efficiency in capital construction. Some progress was made in this direction overall during the first 3.5 years. The plan in general was fulfilled, and some construction organizations even overfulfilled it. But we can achieve more if we work vigorously to utilize existing opportunities to improve the organization of construction work.

The problem of cutting losses of working time also demands solution. They are not being reduced in some organizations, unfortunately. The ways to reduce losses of working time are well-known. The experience of construction workers in the Belorussian Military District and of the collectives headed by colonels-engineers V. Denisov, A. Semonov, V. Bezzmenov, and V. Koyenmin shows that the primary way to accomplish this task is correct use of labor.

It is known ahead of time how many specialists from what fields will be needed at the construction site and when they will be needed. Contingents of military construction workers at training combines are formed and personnel are distributed by specializations on this basis. Training

days are used effectively to improve professional skill and various types of contests are held for best in the occupation.

This is also the objective of the tutor movement. It is typical of military construction sites that most of the workers are young people who have little experience and tentative mastery of construction specializations. Regular workers become tutors and help the military construction workers master the secrets of professional skill. We see tutoring as a concrete way to realize the slogan of the initiators of competition: "Work like shock workers, with no one lagging behind."

In their work on raising labor productivity construction agencies, political departments, and party organizations are devoting considerable attention to the availability of construction machinery. Military construction units have a vast stock of modern construction machines and mechanisms; this equipment is renovated and supplemented each year. The collectives of military builders in the Carpathian and Kiev military districts have accumulated useful experience in the use of construction machines and mechanisms. By correct organization of equipment service and insuring precise maintenance and repair on machinery, they have raised the technical readiness coefficient 5-6 percent above plan.

Unfortunately, this is not the situation at all military construction sites. There are organizations where a considerable number of machines and mechanisms are out of order. This results in large volumes of earth and loading-unloading work being done manually. The plan for comprehensive introduction of small power machinery is going slowly.

Active use of progressive forms and methods of economic management is an important reserve for raising the quality and efficiency of capital construction. More than 80 percent of our construction organizations today work under the new conditions of planning and economic stimulation. They account for more than 85 percent of the contract work and 95 percent of the profit received. Our job is to use the potential of the new system of economic management, its economic and financial levers to raise labor productivity and accelerate construction times, as fully as possible.

Military construction workers were especially pleased by the decree of the CPSU Central Committee and USSR Council of Ministers entitled "Improving Planning and Strengthening the Economic Mechanism to Raise the Efficiency of Production and Quality of Work," which contains a comprehensive program to improve planned management of the economy, management of production, and increasing the creative activism of our collectives.

No one today needs to be persuaded of the importance of the brigade contract for raising the quality of construction and improving communist indoctrination. During the five-year plan the number of brigades in military construction units working on the N. Zlobin method has increased four times. But we have every opportunity to use the brigade contract

even more extensively and to raise the efficiency of work of economically accountable brigades, which is the main thing.

The unlimited potential of socialist competition should be used more rationally. The movement of Komsomol members and young people under the slogan "Youthful enthusiasm and creativity in the service of the five-year plan of quality and efficiency" has become widespread at military construction sites today. Military construction workers, teams, brigades, subunits, and units are working hard to fulfill the annual assignment with fewer personnel, with none lagging behind, and with a personal economy account. They are competing for the right to the title brigade of economical and thrifty workers. The new influx of creative energy has called forth labor competition for the right to be photographed at the Lenin Memorial in Ul'yanyevsk with the Memorial Red Banner of the CPSU Central Committee which was awarded to the Komsomol in honor of its 60th anniversary. Many military construction workers assumed obligations to fulfill the quota for 2.5 years in two years of work.

All these initiatives promote fulfillment of production plans and obligations in competition. Socialist competition has its own leaders, the leaders of military construction. Every military construction site, for example, knows the names of comrades N. Savotikov, L. Volozhinskiy, and N. Maksimov, Soviet army civilian workers who are in charge of comprehensive economically accountable brigades of military construction workers, colonels M. Blokhin, Ya. Svatshov, and V. Patrushev and lieutenant colonels P. Polukhin and S. Stepanov, commanders of military construction detachments which are collectives of communist labor, as well as many others. In their organizations, thanks to precise organization of construction work and purposeful party political work on communist indoctrination of personnel and solidarity of military collectives an excellent political, labor, and moral atmosphere has been created which benefits production work and the state of military discipline.

Implementation of the requirements of the CPSU Central Committee decree "Further Improvement of Ideological and Political Indoctrination Work" is helping improve the activity of commanders, political agencies, and party organizations with respect to communist indoctrination of workers at military construction sites. The efforts of political agencies, party organizations, and all communists are concentrated on raising the quality and efficiency of propaganda and agitation, political information, and ideological indoctrination of personnel and on strengthening military discipline.

Filled with creative energy and enthusiasm, our military construction workers stand their labor watch. They are doing everything they can to carry out the decisions of the 25th CPSU Congress to further strengthen the might of our socialist Motherland.

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MATERIEL: NEED FOR EFFECTIVE SERVICING STRESSED

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 14 Aug 79 p 1

[Editorial: "Exemplary Servicing for Equipment and Weapons"]

[Text] Summer combat training is at its peak. Each day various kinds of modern equipment are used in training periods, tactical exercises, combat duty, distant sea cruises, and flights. It is the duty of every defender of our socialist Fatherland to take good care of the weapons and equipment and keep them in constant combat readiness.

The condition of equipment and weapons, the degree of their readiness for use in battle, and the effectiveness of their use depend on the quality of servicing, observation of established operating and repair procedures, and an intelligent approach by commanders and specialists of subunits, units, ships, staffs, and services to solving these problems. The level of practical skills in servicing and operating machinery and weapons and the occupational skill level of all personnel have become one of the primary indexes of subunit, unit, and ship combat readiness.

The activity of the commander, who is personally responsible to the Communist Party and Soviet Government for the constant combat and mobilization readiness of the unit or ship entrusted to him, should be permeated with concern for exemplary servicing and maintenance of weapons and combat and other equipment. He must take steps to preserve weapons and equipment, maintain them in working order, and use them correctly and periodically inspect their condition and readiness for use in battle. Successful performance of these duties requires that the commander have a good knowledge of the equipment and the special characteristics of its operation, maintenance, and repair.

The service chiefs, fleet specialists, and all engineers and technicians are the commanders' first assistants in organizing study and servicing of weapons and equipment and insuring correct operation and exemplary maintenance of them. While setting a personal example they are obliged to teach the fighting men high personal responsibility for fulfillment

of their functional duties. It is very important that the process of training various categories of specialists be comprehensive in nature, with training and indoctrination questions organically combined.

In this respect, the unit where Lt Col-Engr S. Kosar' is deputy commander in charge of weapons provides an instructive example. In this unit the commander, his deputies, the staff, and the party and Komsomol organization are constantly watching questions of maintaining and operating the equipment and teaching personnel a careful attitude and affection for this equipment. All planned maintenance sessions are discussed in advance and planned carefully. And despite the especially harsh climatic conditions, they are conducted quickly, with high quality work and minimum expenditures. Competition for thorough study of the equipment, exemplary servicing, and saving service life is skillfully organized in subunits of the unit.

That is how things are in many units. Unfortunately, there are also shortcomings. One still meets cases of carelessness toward machinery and violation of maintenance and operating rules. Certain commanders do not give proper attention to the organization of mechanical maintenance and monitoring effective use of time allocated for this purpose; they take specialists away from performance of their functional duties. These things are intolerable and must be eliminated.

The quality of equipment maintenance depends largely on timely performance of regular and other preventive jobs. The large volume of maintenance operations, their variety, the cyclical character of the work, and the sequence of different operations demand careful planning and good organization as well as discipline and smooth teamwork in the actions of all specialists. Complete and timely material-technical supply is a mandatory condition for fulfillment of plans. The condition of monitoring and measuring equipment and metrological support are also very important. Experience shows that engineers and technicians must know the fundamentals of metrology. Commanders, service chiefs, and staff specialists must devote daily attention to the study of these matters and monitoring the maintenance of measuring equipment.

Regularly scheduled servicing days are an important activity for maintaining weapons and equipment in readiness for use in combat. During them it is necessary to assign men and materiel correctly, skillfully organize the labor of specialists and competition among them, and see that the results achieved are comparable and receive publicity and that progressive work methods are widely introduced.

The current qualifications of army and navy specialists and their rich experience in operating equipment under the most varied conditions enable them to find more effective ways of servicing the weapons and equipment and using them in battle. For example, the creative searching of specialists by several antiaircraft missile units of the National Air Defense Forces resulted in the practical introduction of a progressive new system of servicing for antiaircraft missile complexes. As a result maintenance time was cut in half. The high efficiency of the new

maintenance systems shows that specialists took a party-minded attitude toward the problem of raising the readiness of equipment for use in battle. Their work experience deserves thorough, profound study.

While solving the difficult and important problems of combat and political training in the summer training period and organizing socialist competition, our commanders, political workers, and staff and service officers must continue to give unflagging attention to care of the physical equipment and studying and introducing the know-how of the best specialists. It is their suggestions whose realization can lead to a rise in combat readiness.

Party and Komsomol organizations are expected to make an important contribution to this work. Communists and Komsomol members must give constant attention to insuring that they set an example in mastering, maintaining, and servicing combat and other equipment, teaching the men to take pride in their equipment and confidence that it will operate reliably and without trouble, and disseminating progressive practices and technical knowledge.

Irreproachable and high-quality performance of all activities related to mechanical maintenance, skillful use of the equipment, and exemplary maintenance will guarantee high combat readiness in the subunits, units, and ships and successful fulfillment of combat training plans and obligations in socialist competition.

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COMBINED ARMS: FACTORS IN DESERT COMBAT DISCUSSED

Moscoe KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 14 Aug 79 p 2

[Article by Col V. Shan'gin, senior officer, combat training division of the Red Banner Turkestan M. D.: "In Special Conditions"]

[Text] After bringing up reserves from the depth the "enemy" went on the counterattack. The regimental commander decided to repulse the attack with stationary fire. The subunits, which occupied a favorable line, shifted slightly to the right. After driving back the counterattack plans envisioned committing the tank battalion commanded by Guards Maj V. Svatok to the battle.

At first events developed according to the regimental commander's plan. The enemy was unable to capture the initiative, even though he counterattacked with superior forces. Then the tanks began advancing from behind the barkhans. It appeared that the turning point in the battle was near. But it did not come. The sector into which the battalion was committed had a large number of high barkhans of semisecured sand. The commander and staff made serious mistakes in surmounting this obstacle.

Immediately after deploying into columns the companies had to operate out of visual contact with one another. Under these conditions it is especially important not to permit gaps in the battle formation and to achieve a smooth, simultaneous attack. The maneuver required special command and control skills from the commanders, and they did not have them. When the left-flank company reached the line of attack the right-flank company was not visible. The subordinates of Guards Sr Lt S. Shestopalov had lost their orientation in the barkhans. The battalion commander tried to straighten out the situation, but his commands did not reach the subunits because the radio was not working. The subunit chief of staff at this time was somewhere in the battle formations, out of contact with either the battalion commander or the regimental staff.

The enemy took advantage of these mistakes by the tank troops. He moved additional antitank weapons into the tank danger sectors and

called in fire support helicopters. Personnel of the battalion delayed in opening fire against the aerial targets because the high crests of the barkhans hampered their observation. Skillfully concealing themselves behind the barkhans the helicopters were able to deliver devastating strikes against the tanks.

Later, when the battle was already finished, Guards Maj V. Svatok tried to explain what happened by reference to the command tank's being knocked out and loss of communication with the companies and regimental headquarters. Indeed, this did affect the actions of the subunit. But in actual battle, after all, the commander is not always master of the airways and the command vehicle, as well as the radio station, may go out in battle too. In such a situation another officer must assume control. That is why the battle order contains a point which begins with the words, "My deputy is." At the critical moment, however, no deputy's voice was heard.

Nonetheless, the temporary loss of communications was not the main reason for the battalion's failure. A much more important factor was the underestimation by commanders of the special characteristics of the desert, what is known as the "local factor." The exercise showed that the subunit officers had not mastered all procedures of command and control in desert terrain. But when we paged through the records of commander training we saw that most of the officers had received high marks for tactical training. It is clear that their skills were tested in a situation that did not resemble combat, with stable radio communications on terrain where all obstacles were familiar.

Then, when they had to organize battle under more difficult conditions the gaps in their professional training became evident. Guards Maj V. Svatok, for example, did not think through the organization of cooperation in detail and missions given to company commanders were put in very general terms. It was assumed that the necessary specifications could be added by radio. In other words, the battalion commander was not aware of the full complexity of maintaining cooperation among subunits that are lost in the barkhans without visual contact and he did not develop an appropriate attitude in his officers. Here is another instructive instance. Guards Sr Lt V. Kondrashov, whose company was held in reserve, found that communications with the battalion commander were out. He quickly led his tanks onto a high ridge, as if saying "Here we are." He did not consider the fact that at this moment his tanks became a target for the enemy.

Fighting in the desert caused not just hypothetical but also actual losses to the tank soldiers. Several tanks dropped behind. These were vehicles which had mounted equipment for making breaches in mine fields. Special skills are needed to drive sweeper-equipped tanks in sand. Their mechanic-drivers did not have the necessary skills.

Again let us return to the register. The mechanic-drivers generally received good and outstanding marks for their performance of regular exercises. These took place on the familiar roads of the tank training

ground, without mounted equipment. But they were unable to demonstrate the same skills in the desert.

The local factor. In the mountains it forces commanders to pay serious attention to the preparation of encircling detachments and organizing reliable, multitiered defense. In the forest vigorous actions by small subunits are especially important for developing the success. There are special characteristics of battle in a city. The desert is the same. Sometimes it is hard for a commander to determine the nature of the desert from a map. A solid yellow space forces him to look at the region of upcoming actions through the eyes of others, the eyes of reconnaissance agencies. Without constant and vigorous engineering reconnaissance, which is expected to determine the passability of roadless terrain, one cannot survive. Unfortunately, some commanders think that engineering reconnaissance is the work of specialized subunits. Experience shows convincingly that this is an unacceptable belief for a combined arms commander. The outcome of battle depends on his ability to evaluate the terrain from an engineering standpoint. This skill must be developed persistently during exercises, command-staff drills, group exercises, and various tactical missions.

Let us take camouflage for another example. It is not easy to conceal equipment and personnel in a sand desert. The commander must provide an original approach, creativity, and a thorough knowledge of the characteristics of the terrain. Here is an actual example. In a certain desert sector a ridge of barkhans was surrounded by a semicircle of takyrs [desert soil areas]. A missile battalion occupied positions in this unique "cup," enclosed on three sides. The missile soldiers carefully camouflaged their equipment and set up observation posts. The commander assumed that the "enemy" would undertake vigorous ground and air reconnaissance in order to find the missile launchers. He also anticipated the possibility that a tactical airborne landing party would be landed. A tank company and a motorized rifle company were singled out to repulse it.

Toward evening the tank soldiers set up a strongpoint on the slopes of the barkhans. Capt G. Vorob'yev organized the system of fire to bring flanking fire to bear on the only tank danger sector. The company in infantry combat vehicles, commanded by Sr Lt Kh. Kasymov, was deployed in the depth. Its right-flank platoon moved closer to the takyrs, which enabled them to maneuver swiftly to reinforce subunits hit hard in the fighting. Fire against aerial targets was planned in case of a tactical airborne landing. The missile soldiers set up dummy positions and the tank and motorized rifle soldiers established fake strongpoints. All these things took a great deal of effort by the commanders and personnel, but they justified themselves completely.

It was the dummy positions, believed to be actual ones, that the enemy helicopters carrying the landing party headed for. The tank and motorized rifle soldiers opened fire against the helicopters of the cover group just when the last machine carrying the landing party had landed. At the same moment the tanks came out of concealment onto the plateau and deployed in a battle line, smashing the helicopters of the landing

group and the landing party. The platoon in infantry personnel carriers under the command of Lt A. Allanazarov emerged from the flank of the tank company by a swift maneuver and raced on to attack the landing party from the rear. Thus the enemy was not even able to engage in battle in an organized manner and suffered large losses. That is what it means to consider the local factor in battle.

The desert also demands special attention to the psychological and physical conditioning of personnel. At a certain exercise I had an opportunity to witness how, following a march and commitment to battle on the run, the young fighting men of a company did not have the strength left for an attack. This was a result of the heat; fatigue came on especially fast and failure to follow drinking water rules led to a sharp loss of strength. This also showed that during everyday training the personnel of the subunits always went to the tank training grounds, tactical fields, and firing range in their vehicles. They avoided marching on foot to training, which would have allowed them to improve the psychological and physical conditioning of the men.

Every tactical exercise in the desert provides rich food for thought for commanders and reveals some facets that were not encountered before. Thorough analysis of experiences, regular exchange of know-how, and prompt generalization of everything new and progressive — this is the tried and proven way to improve the readiness of units and subunits for actions which the regulations call "special."

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COMBINED ARMS: NEED FOR GOOD MARCH TRAINING STRESSED

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 16 Aug 79 p 1

[Editorial] "March Training"]

[Text] Under current conditions where troop combat actions are characterized by exceptional mobility and dynamism and great spatial extent, where battle demands swift movement of troops from the depth to develop the success or shift efforts to a different sector, the role of march training and unit and subunit mobility has increased sharply.

The march capabilities of a subunit are determined by the combat characteristics of the equipment it has. The speeds and cross-country capabilities of vehicles have increased markedly in recent years and their range without refueling has grown. More and more vehicles are capable of surmounting water obstacles, by floating or along the bottom, without crossing equipment and have special devices for making breaches in minefields and operating in regions of radioactive contamination. This provides a reliable material foundation for the high march capabilities of our units and subunits. But the rate of march does not depend on the tactical and technical specifications of the vehicles only; it also depends on the degree of personnel training and their moral and psychological conditioning. One must learn to get the most from the equipment. This is the program of concrete actions for each military collective, the primary guideline in combat improvement.

Improving march training is a continuous process. Elements of the march are practiced at almost every field training period. But tactical exercises conducted far from the permanent bases of units and subunits, in unfamiliar terrain in a situation maximally approximating that of combat, make the greatest contribution to raising the march readiness of the troops. It is precisely under these conditions that commanders and staff and service officers acquire the ability to organize marches quickly, provide comprehensive support for them, and control columns skillfully.

The march is a major test of the ability of subunits to work smoothly in battle and their level of technical preparedness and physical and

psychological conditioning. Many units and subunits performed well on the march in the recent Neman troop exercise. Rational organization of march formation, careful reconnaissance of routes of travel, and skillful passage through difficult sectors testified to the tactical maturity of the commanders and great skill of the drivers.

The motorized riflemen of the battalion commanded by Capt A. Koshkin (Group of Soviet Forces in Germany) carried out a march during a difficult tactical exercise in model fashion. This was the result of constant attention to questions of march organization and the system of command training, and to thoughtful, careful work with drivers. The subunit has created all necessary conditions for improving the skill of the drivers. Regular contests are held for the title of best specialist, and mutual help and exchange of know-how have been organized.

Unfortunately, march training does not always receive the attention which the interests of combat readiness demand. Certain subunits are content with high scores achieved in marches over familiar terrain under conditions that are far from those of actual combat. Tougher testing reveals serious omissions in their field training. The tank soldiers of the battalion commanded by Maj V. Svatok, for example, lost several vehicles while crossing a desert sector. They were equipped with mine-sweepers. The reason they were lost was that the mechanic-drivers did not have good skills; before this they had drilled in simplified conditions.

Every subunit must always be ready to begin a march without prolonged preparation and to carry it out secretly at maximum speed. This means not only along paved and field roads, but also across roadless areas. Experience shows that readiness for the march is higher where problems of technical training are practiced together with tactics, where the march is viewed as an inseparable part of highly mobile combat actions. Every fighting man must be deeply aware that troop movements under current conditions will usually be carried out under constant threat of enemy use of weapons of mass destruction, opposed by enemy aviation and reconnaissance-sabotage groups and detachments. After a march of many hours during the daytime or nighttime the situation may demand that the troops immediately enter battle.

Questions of march organization should occupy an important place in the system of professional training for officers. Commanders and staff and service officers are expected to work hard mastering ways of organizing marches quickly and providing material, technical, and medical support. They must be thoroughly aware of the march capabilities of their own, attached, and supporting subunits and the tactics of protection on the move. There must be careful study of managing columns under special conditions, in the mountains, deserts, and northern regions, and in forested and swampy terrain. Officer training must aim at insuring precise, coordinated, and operational work by all duty personnel on whom the success of the march depends. Good mutual understanding is essential at each level of command and control.

Socialist competition has a large part to play in improving troop march training. The struggle to master the equipment is a major area of competition. It is important to create a competitive atmosphere at all training periods and exercises and mobilize personnel to surpass established standards. The march capabilities of the equipment are used more fully when the subunit takes care to raise the ratings of its drivers and driver-mechanics and to train back-up drivers from men who have mastered related specializations.

The march is a major test for political agencies and party organizations of units and subunits. Party political work should be highly operational and purposeful during preparation and conduct of marches. It is expected to instill personnel with an unbreakable resolution to reach the assigned region on time in full combat readiness despite any difficulties. Individual and group talks with drivers, reference to the brilliant history of the Great Patriotic War and experience at major troop exercises, meetings of soldiers from different weapons arms who are marching together, and correct distribution of party and Komsomol activists through the column — these are things that affect personnel and help raise their combat activism. Communists and Komsomol members must set an example of diligent performance, march discipline, and high vigilance on the march and create an atmosphere of mutual help and comradely support en route.

To intensify the attention given to problems of troop march training, seek and find more effective ways of improving it, and help each officer become a thoroughly prepared march organizer and master column leader means to raise the combat readiness of our units and subunits to a new level.

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PERSONNEL: POLITICAL TRAINING OF WARRANT OFFICERS CRITICIZED

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 17 Aug 79 p 2

[Article by Lt Col G. Sviridenko, Red Banner Kiev M. D.: "It Is Too Soon to Beat the Drums"]

[Text] The classroom where students of the warrant officer [praporshchik] political training group were gathering for a training period was relatively empty. Only about half of the enrolled students were there. And soon there were even fewer. Capt A. Bondarenko, group training leader, had not even managed to announce the topic of the seminar before a messenger from headquarters entered and said, "Call for Warrant Officer Petrov, chief of the clothing store. Gear must be issued immediately."

Runners came in later for two more students.

"That always happens. But what can you do; that is the way the warrant officer's job is," the captain explained to me in confusion.

He wanted very much to present the group in the best light. But he was having a hard time.

Most of the students's outlines had been done in a hurry, without much care. It was hard to reconstruct the subject of the period from their notes, to say nothing of the content. Of course, there were also some which looked impressive, but they had been written a long time ago. Student A. Kovalev, for example, submitted an outline which he had put together while he was still a regular-term soldier. But after serving a fairly long time in the regiment, he had not found time to outline a single lecture or work recommended for independent study.

The seminar was slow-moving and uninteresting. Moreover, as already mentioned, it was interrupted several times. There would be a knock at the classroom door and the airc... familiar messenger from headquarters would call out another student. One was needed at the store, another at a shop. Why, for example, did Lt Col Yu. Miroshinokov, deputy regimental commander, call fro WO S. Galkin, a cook instructor? The reason was

that without the warrant officer there was no one to turn on the gas stove!

When we talked with Lieutenant Colonel Miroshnikov later he did not make excuses; far from it, he was on the offensive. Rear services, he said, take a lot of time and you cannot anticipate everything.

"Now you say that Galkin does not know the material at all? Well so what? He is an outstanding specialist. For that alone he should be given an outstanding mark in political training."

This is a strange point of view for a communist leader. Of course, he did not deny the importance of ideological conditioning of subordinates. I am sure that at a party meeting he might well speak about the usefulness of political training and make an appeal to constantly improve its quality. But then it comes down to the work, and where does his understanding of the importance of the matter go? It is immediately forgotten that the struggle for good quality training periods must begin with ordinary regular attendance. A desire appears to cover up his own organizational mistakes and poor discipline by certain subordinates by references to specific requirements of the service. What do you want, he seems to say, from the warrant officers? They have so many jobs. If you take them away from their work sectors life in the regiment will stop.

Unfortunately, the deputy regimental commander was not the only one to think that way. It seemed to me that some of the comrades there had become accustomed to their own lack of organization and accepted the absolutely wrong belief that the problem of class attendance is hardly important for the warrant officer group. There is nothing to do about it, they say, because of all their specific jobs. However, where people do not take refuge in such excuses but rather show true party concern for the ideological growth of warrant officers they have no problems with class attendance or learning.

And examples, as they say, are not far to seek. We inspected a similar group in the neighboring regiment where officer Ya. Shostak serves. Its students demonstrated profound knowledge and were very active in discussion of the issues. Warrant officers V. Prokhorov, V. Dun', A. Tkachenko, and other comrades gave very gratifying answers. This regiment has developed the rule of holding communist leaders responsible first of all when students do not appear at class. The warrant officers themselves are also held strictly responsible. Thus the "problem" of class attendance disappears and the practice of calling men away from training periods stops.

In short, we had a serious discussion. The regimental commander and his deputies, the unit propagandist, and party activists agreed with our conclusions. But even then I decided that in a while I would come back and see how the criticism had been followed up in practice.

I must say that changes for the better were noticeable. The question of improving the quality of the political training of warrant officers in light of the CPSU Central Committee decree entitled "Further Improvement of Ideological and Political Indoctrination Work" was discussed in the regiment at an expanded session of the party committee. Party activists, taking account of the bitter lesson of the past, planned and are conducting concrete work with these servicemen.

The warrant officer council, for example, has become more active. It organized a meeting under the title "Bring political training to the level of party demands," and at the meeting there was sharp, principled discussion. Those students who had not been conscientious toward their studies had reason to be embarrassed.

The monthly warrant officer days in the unit are more interesting now. They now conduct other activities in addition to presenting lectures and reports. For example, Maj V. Nesvit, the best methodologist in the regiment and commander of an outstanding battalion, familiarized the warrant officers with the techniques of independent work with primary sources. Maj I. Belous, a member of the unit party committee, shared his experience with political self-education. These things notably improved the activity of warrant officers at training periods and had a good effect on their ideological growth.

However, I think it is too soon to beat the drums. I also witnessed the following. WO M. Opara was going to class. The chief of the regimental clothing service called out to him, "You have to go to the store immediately."

Although the warrant officer tried to explain to the major that it was time for him to go to political training, the major insisted.

No, not all communist leaders have become permeated with responsibility for this important sector, the ideological conditioning of the warrant officers under them.

Another case also puts me on guard. At lectures before warrant officers did not take notes, and now they do. But they write mechanically, as if the propagandists were dictating. This is precisely what happened at the period conducted by Capt I. Tkach, chief of the regimental chemical service. The officer, who did not have his own outline, dictated a journal article to the students (incidentally, they were two groups taken together).

These things force us to reflect. Above all they make us realize that certain officials are still strongly subject to the formalistic attitude toward this important work sector: political training of warrant officers.

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ABUSE OF 'DUTY OFFICER' FUNCTION CRITICIZED

Moscow KRAYNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 20 Aug 79 p 2

[Editorial and comments by Gds Lt Col Nikolay Pavlovich Abanin: "Measure of Responsibility"]

[Text] The practice of appointing "responsible" officers employed in certain units has been discussed more than once in KRAYNAYA ZVEZDA. Letters to the editors have indicated that the elimination of this practice has helped regulate the officers' workday, augmented the role of noncommissioned officers and strengthened regulation order.

The editors continue to receive letters stating something different, however. The following are a few excerpts from those letters.

"In addition to the unit duty officer and his assistant," writes Senior Lieutenant M. Yegorov, a platoon commander, "we also appoint a daily duty officer for the subunit. The officers therefore have as many as eight details per month."

The officer attached a copy of the official instructions to his letter. The style of those instructions simulates that of regulations: "A subunit duty officer is appointed from among the subunit commanders or, as an exception, from among the other officers (platoon commanders, radar station chiefs); disciplined, strong-willed and demanding...." An extensive list of specific duties follows this.

A schedule of details was also attached to the letter, in which the function of "duty officer" is equated to the daily duty detail.

Captain V. Aleshin writes from another unit: "Our 'duty' officers are on duty from 1700 hours to 900 hours. They receive no rest break. From morning on, the officer performs his regular duties, in the evening he becomes the duty officer and the next day he conducts classes."

What the author of the letter writes is confirmed in the "The Duties of the Subunit Duty Officer," which were written up by Captain L. Kislenko, chief of staff. The duties are many, but not a single one of them is assigned to any certain responsible individual by regulations.

It is apparent from these and other letters that regulation order is inconceivable in some places without the "duty officers." "Following the last article in KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, which condemned the appointing of 'duty officers,'" writes an officer in the Far East, "the unit commander had the following to say at a service meeting: 'The article is a good one and it is right that the subject be brought up. This does not concern us, however.'"

It seems that such conclusions as the above are also possible.

The editors showed the letters about "duty officers" to Guards Lieutenant Colonel Nikolay Pavlovich Abanin, commander of the Guards Novgorod-Berlin Tank Regiment. This is what he had to say:

Several political indoctrinational activities were being conducted one Sunday in the subunits of our unit. Guards Major V. Kartashev, deputy regimental commander for political affairs, arrived in the unit to help the young officers conduct those measures. He had barely passed through the main gate checkpoint when the mess hall duty officer, a warrant officer recently arrived from another unit, approached him with a troubled look on his face. "What is going on?" he asked with alarm. "It is almost time for mess and you have not checked to see that the kettle has been filled according to the regulations." When the political worker answered that he had no intention of performing the duty officer's functions, the warrant officer asked with surprise:

"But aren't you the regiment duty officer today?"

It turned out that in the unit in which the warrant officer had previously served, "duty" officers were appointed each day, who essentially replaced the daily duty detail, including the mess hall duty officer. Exactly the same instructions were in effect there as those described in the letter to the editors by Senior Lieutenant Yegorov. The "duty" officers were responsible for maintaining internal order and fulfillment of the daily schedule, for the cleanliness of the buildings, for getting the personnel up on time, for the morning inspection, and so forth.

I would not be so bold as to accuse the commanders of that unit and others in which such "duty" officers are appointed of a lack of knowledge of the internal service regulations. They are certainly aware of the fact that everything assigned to the "duty" officers are the immediate service duties of the company duty officer, the deputy platoon commander, the section commander, the mess hall duty officer, and so forth.

The "duty officers" have their own story. They first came into being, as I recall, in the units and subunits with inexperienced commanders. They possessed a good knowledge of tactics and of the combat equipment and wanted to establish exemplary regulation order in the section assigned them within

the shortest possible time and to insure a high level of discipline, but they encountered difficulties because of their lack of experience. Many of them lacked the ability and the willingness to rely upon their immediate assistants, especially sergeants. This gave rise to schedules in the companies and battalions, which required platoon commanders to be present at reveille and retreat to "back up" the noncommissioned officers.

This produced certain results, immediate results, which was especially important. The "duty" officers began to be known almost as mentors of the junior commanders, imparting their know-how to the latter on a practical level. Some of the senior commanders perceived this experience as something worthy of dissemination. Schedules and instructions duplicating regulation requirements began to multiply. "Duty" officers came into being on the regimental level as well.

Soon, however, negative aspects of this practice became apparently. Aware of the presence of "doubles" at their side every day, the noncommissioned officers became less active in the training and indoctrination of the soldiers and in the maintenance of firm regulation order. One has to agree that it is not a simple matter for an individual to be active and demonstrate initiative when he knows that no reliance is placed upon him even in minor matters. The thought is always with the sergeant that if he makes an error the "duty" officer will correct it.

In some subunits it has reached the point at which the platoon commander performs the duties of the section commander and the company duty officer. It has even gone beyond that point. The "Official Instructions" attached to the letter from Senior Lieutenant Yegorov assigned noncommissioned officer duties to the platoon commander only as an exception. In general--one cannot help smiling at this--the subunit "duty" officer's duties are only to be performed by the subunit commander himself. According to the schedule, he is "responsible" on Mondays. It would appear, then, that he has no responsibility on Tuesdays.

We can understand what motivated the authors of the letters to write to the editors. They are certainly not complaining about the burdens of the service. The appointing of "duty" officers, who are forced to perform the duties of junior commanders, first of all, wounds the officer's self-esteem and damages his authority.

Can the "responsible" officers be held responsible in the legal sense of the word? No, they cannot. I know of the following case: A company commander imposed a penalty upon a company duty officer for poorly performing the instructions of the "responsible" officer, a platoon commander. The superior commander was forced to intervene, to point out the serious error to the company commander. After all, the internal service regulations state that the company duty officer is subordinate to the regimental duty officer and his assistant and on the level of internal service, to the company commander and first sergeant. The "responsible" officer can therefore only observe the detail's service but does not have the right to issue any sort of instructions to it.

I also know of another case. In a certain company, in the presence of the "responsible" officer, the commander of the first platoon, a serious violation of military discipline occurred in the second platoon. The commander of this platoon and the company commander were disciplined. With respect to the "responsible" officer, his company commander could only reprove him: "You let me down, you know...." And that is the situation on the legal level with respect to "responsible" officers.

The "doubles" of sergeants and of regimental, company and mess hall duty officers are of no actual benefit. Appointing them--a fact rightly stated on the pages of KRASNAYA ZVEZDA--only harms the indoctrinal work. Officers assigned service duties demanding constant exertion of all their mental and physical capabilities waste a great deal of time on unnecessary vigil. And, after all, life itself demands that they unceasingly improve their professional training and expand their ideological-political and cultural perspective. This requires time. The officers also have families, a fact which can also not be ignored.

The regulations should not be "supplemented" even under the plausible pretext of striving for strict order. The regulations are based on practically tested experience.

Take a look at the subunits in which there is hesitation about giving up the "responsible" officers. As a rule, they are not particularly successful ones. One could not say that order based upon the "responsible" officers is solidly based.

There have been no gross violations of military discipline or instances of nonregulation interrelations in our regiment for a long time. We have never had to resort to "responsible officers" or to seek any other means of strengthening regulation order aside from those prescribed by regulations.

Take, for example, the outstanding tank battalion which was commanded until recently by Guards Major V. Yegoryshev and is presently under the command of Guards Major V. Zhorebtsov. The spirit and letter of regulations are observed throughout in this battalion. The noncommissioned officers are supposed to be roused 10 minutes before the "reveille" signal, and the duty officer does this at exactly the right time. Without any additional reminders. The conduct of classes at the platoon commander's instruction has been made the deputy platoon commander's duty, and he conducts them. No one is going to substitute for him. The company first sergeant is required to take the company to the mess hall or to send it under the command of one of the deputy platoon commanders, and this is how it is done. Each individual has his own duties, his own measure of responsibility.

I agree that in some training subunits the future junior commanders are not provided with the skills they could receive given the training time available, the material and technical base and the educational level of the students.

Despite this, most of the regiments still receive reliable noncommissioned officer replacements. One only has to work with them seriously and painstakingly and constantly teach the junior commanders pedagogics and psychology, demandingness and sensitivity and ways and methods of organizing competition and uniting the sections, teams and crews. The "responsible" officers are not needed and are not justified in this large job.

Competitions for best crew were recently held in the regiment. The winners were the men led by Guards Senior Sergeant V. Neborak and Guards Sergeants L. Gamanyuk and R. Aleyev. They were also the victors in the battalion competitions. When the senior chief asked the soldiers who had taught them to fire so accurately and to operate the vehicles so skillfully, they all had the same answer: "The sergeants." This did not bother the officers, because when asked who had taught them to train the crews so efficiently, the sergeants answered with the same unanimity: "The officers, the platoon commanders." This confirms the immutability of the principle whereby the commander teaches the subordinate.

Our noncommissioned officers are, of course, trained not only by their immediate commanders, they receive a great deal of attention from all the officers. The forms of training and indoctrination vary: There are classes for officers and classes on instructional methods, briefings, talks, question-and-answer sessions in the evenings and service conferences. The sergeants whose men have achieved the greatest success in training and discipline, as well as those whose crews are not up to standard, speak at weekly conferences conducted by myself or by one of the deputy regimental commanders. We get around to all of them. We ask what the sergeants regard as advanced know-how and how they would explain the reasons for deficiencies. We then express our own point of view, offer advice and assign the tasks for the forthcoming week. In short, we truly have a conference at which the atmosphere is always relaxed.

I will not make the assertion that we have ideal order throughout. The life of the regiment is complex and multifaceted and we also have officers who are not conscientious enough. Guards Lieutenants S. Mamontov and V. Kulakov have served in the unit for several months. The former lacks diligence, the latter self-discipline. When the workday is over, they both depart the subunits "at the bell." And during the day, they do not do everything possible by far to prepare the sergeants, recent graduates of training companies, to perform their tasks on their own, to conduct the morning inspection properly, to set up the cleaning of the weapons and so forth. In a way, I understand Guards Captain A. Shegol'kov and Guards Senior Lieutenant V. Ryaboshtan, company commanders, when I hear them say that they have to spell out everything for Mamontov (or Kulakov), to tell them what activities in the platoon they have to attend, and when, and exactly what they should cover. I advised them not to do this, however. One cannot spell out everything. With respect to regulation duties, and they include the instruction periodically to attend reveille and the evening inspection, absolute strictness should be exercised.

The decree passed by the CPSU Central Committee "On Further Improving Ideological and Political-Indoctrinal Work" evoked a profound response in our regiment, as it did in every other unit. Proud of the good appraisal of the military service, a school of labor and military indoctrination, moral purity and courage, patriotism and comradeship, we are searching persistently for ways to further increase its indoctrinal role. In this process we must rely upon the glorious traditions, carefully apply everything new and progressive and resolutely reject everything not proven by experience.

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NEW METHODS OF OFFICER TECHNICAL TRAINING DESCRIBED

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 21 Aug 79 p 2

[Article by Maj V. Ostromenskiy and comment by Col V. Chekalin, a senior officer in the combat training of engineer troops under the USSR Ministry of Defense: "Tested by Experience"]

[Text] Reality itself has placed technical training among the leading training disciplines. The better the equipment in a subunit is mastered, the higher is its level of combat readiness. The special difficulty of this training subject is also obvious: A single company may include a special vehicle operator, a crane operator, a diver, a pontonier.... And each of them must be equipped with a solid body of knowledge and skills. Is this easy to do? No, it is not.

For the second year, however, unit personnel have received the highest marks for technical training in all the tests. How have we achieved this?

Year before last, we began in the fall to actively employ the group system for the training of specialists. It essentially consists of the following: Related specialists of all the subunits, launch operators, for example, train together in a group, the drivers train in another, and so forth. While this form of training was previously employed only at the separate training stage, prior to the combat coordination of a subunit, we now also devote one day a week to specialist assemblies at the stage of coordination of sections, platoons and companies.

What is the result of the additional assemblies? It has become possible to place the best trained officers in a given field in charge of the classes. Major I. Marchuk, deputy subunit commander for technical affairs, has taken on the training of launch operators, Senior Lieutenant S. Grishenko works with the drivers, and Lieutenant V. Pashenko trains the pontoniers.... Better use is being made of the training materials base. Previously, on technical training days, one might say that it "was stretched" over the platoon and simply did not go far enough. The classes improved markedly when the training materials base began to be used in the new way.

We were concerned at first by the fact that special planning had to be performed for assembly day. This placed a large load upon headquarters. The effort fully justified itself, however: The technical training of unit personnel had never before been so good or so stable. We successfully fulfilled socialist commitments during each training period. The unit has been awarded the Challenge Red Banner of the military council of the ground forces.

The following feature also came out in our organization of technical training. The instructors began taking a more differentiated approach to the trainees, giving greater consideration to their knowledge and skills. This has been achieved by dividing the specialists into subgroups of four to five individuals and giving them assignments of varying complexity. While an officer or warrant officer is working with the new men, giving them the basics, first- and second-class specialists study more complicated subjects and then take an exam. Many specialists have combined the training plan with independent preparation to acquire technical expertise which the program does not require and have become active assistants to the officers.

The editors showed this letter to Colonel V. Chekalin, senior officer for the combat training of engineer troops under the USSR Ministry of Defense. This is what he had to say:

"The author of the letter has described in detail the system of methods employed in the unit to organize the technical training of the personnel. I would add to this the fact that this training process is extremely economical. By successfully fulfilling their socialist commitments, the fighting men have conserved a considerable quantity of fuels and lubricants and are maintaining the equipment in exemplary condition.

"The efficient use of specialist assemblies as a form of training at the stage of separate training for the fighting men also produces good results subsequently. The experience of the unit in which the author of the letter serves is deserving of creative application in other units and subunits of the Engineer Troops as well."

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PONTOON REGIMENT TRAINING DESCRIBED

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 23 Aug 79 p 1

[Article by Lt Col P. Goshko, Red Banner Kiev Military District: "The Crossing"]

[Text] The river had left its banks after the abundant rains. Vast and gloomy under the inclement skies, it appeared impregnable.

"Yes, it's not a river but a real sea. How are we going to set up a crossing?" Private N. Lyutnov said with concern.

Lieutenant Colonel S. Sinyekol, who was standing next to the young soldier, encouraged him:

"With our equipment we could even partition off the sea."

The veteran pontoniers were also seriously concerned about the impending crossing. At this point, the political worker decided to tell them how our fighting men had performed in such situations during the Great Patriotic War.

"In September 1943, one of the combat engineer battalions was ordered to set up a crossing for a rifle regiment on this very same river. There was a minimum of time available. There was almost no river crossing equipment.

"The front-line soldiers were not deterred by the difficulties. They began chopping down trees, making rafts and carrying them to the crossing site. They also used empty fuel barrels. The task was accomplished."

The talk was a short one, but it made a real impression upon the pontoniers and gave them the shot of confidence they needed so much.

When the approach routes had been made, a field club stopped at the future fording site. Captain A. Nekipelov, the club chief, and Lieutenant A. Guzhviy, secretary of the Komsomol organization, brought the fighting men up to date on socialist competition and the winners at that stage of training. The best unit specialists then spoke on the radio.

The talks by the political workers, the local radio broadcasts and the personal example set by the activists were all part of a single system under which party-political work was conducted during exercises in the regiment. It was planned in advance of the departure for the field. At an enlarged session, for example, the party committee members assigned each activist a specific area of work for the exercises. Senior Lieutenant V. Brovarets, a communist, for example, was responsible for visual agitation, and Lieutenant A. Guzhviy, was in charge of publicizing the experience of those out front in the competition.

By proceeding in a concrete manner and relying upon the aktiv, we achieved a situation in which party influence upon the men was continuous and effective. Its substance corresponded to the nature of the tasks being performed by the pontoniers and prompted initiative and creativity. This is the way it was at all the preceding stages. And this is the way it was at the crucial moment in the exercise, the erection of the crossing itself. The regiment activists naturally gave special attention to this stage. They made full use of the efficient forms of influencing the men: a word of approval or reproach, advise and recommendations. Their main weapon was personal example, however. Stationed in the most important areas, the communists set an example of courage, initiative and perseverance for the pontoniers.

When the tanks, their tracks clanking upon the metal bed of the bridge bent by their weight, reached the opposite bank, Private Lyutnov said with admiration:

"With such a pontoon party committee as ours no crossing can frighten us."

"And with such pontoniers as ours," added Lieutenant Colonel S. Sinyekol, political worker.

"When they are led by communists," I would like to add myself.

11499

CSO: 1801

MOTOR TRANSPORT BATTALION ECONOMY MEASURES DESCRIBED

Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 24 Aug 79 p 1

[Article by Maj M. Nezlobin, Red Banner Belorussian Military District:
"With Strict Accounting--For Economy and Thrift"]

[Text] In the subunit Lenin Room there are charts showing the consumption of fuel and lubricants and of other expensive materials and the mileage of the vehicles. These are a kind of personal accounts of fighting men, reflecting each one's contribution to the national campaign to conserve materials. We consider the weekly and monthly figures for conservation of fuel and lubricants and for extending the service life of assemblies and systems when we determine the best specialists and the winners of socialist competition. The campaign for thrift has become an integral part of the training and indoctrinal process.

Enthusiastically supporting the initiative of the Baltic Sea fighting men, the personnel of our motor vehicle battalion accepted large commitments for economy and thrift. The enthusiasm of the fighting men had to be backed up with organizational work.

Take the procedure for utilizing the motor vehicles, for example. Previously, information on how extensively and efficiently one vehicle or another was being used was only analyzed at the end of the year. Technical unit workers now sum up the results monthly. This disciplines the drivers and the officers using the transport and forces those in charge to consider what each trip has cost and whether it was economically justified. We also took into account the fact that the consumption of fuel and lubricants and the degree of wear of the tires also depends upon the workers manning the technical control point.

Most of the 10 vehicles dispatched by a young dispatcher without the required technical inspection, for example, returned with excessive consumption of gasoline, even with broken parts. We publicized this incident and discussed it at a meeting of officers and warrant officers. Senior Lieutenant V. Gorlov, warrant officers B. Mazurkevich and N. Klimovich, and Sergeant S. Savko became stricter and more demanding when they checked out the vehicles

for trips. They will not permit a vehicle to leave the pool until they are convinced that the brakes and carburetor are properly adjusted, the wheels are properly balanced and aligned, and so forth.

The pool service has also become stricter in the following respect. Formerly, if a driver had had no accidents on a trip and had completed his assignment, he was patted on the back, so to speak. The amount of fuel and other materials used on the trip, however, was not determined until considerably later. We instituted a daily comparison of the results achieved by the platoons, sections and drivers performing tasks on identical routes and under similar conditions. A nonuniform picture emerged. Some were conserving fuel and lubricants, while others were overconsuming, offering numerous "valid" reasons as justification. We became more demanding not only of the drivers but of the senior members of the vehicle crews as well. This helped our cause. We have now achieved a considerable saving for all indicators.

Only highly skilled specialists are capable of economizing. We should not forget this for a single minute. We have made the scheduled exercises in the specialty more effective and have stepped up the classwork. This training year we plan to prepare a third of the drivers for the first- and second-class tests and to train every tenth operator to drive buses.

We are already thinking about the peculiarities of operating the equipment during the fall and winter period and about ways to conserve materials under the more rigid weather conditions. Our campaign for conservation is producing not only perceptible material results. It is also a powerful means of indoctrinating the personnel, of developing communist thrift in each fighting man.

11499
CSO: 1801

OPERATIONAL CAMOUFLAGE IN LENINGRAD BATTLE DESCRIBED

MOSCOW KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 28 Aug 79 p 4

[Article by Capt 1st-Rank M. Korenevskiy: "An Operational Camouflage Display--In the Duel with the Abwehr"]

[Text] I would like to begin this narrative with the recorded words of a front-line general and participant in the defense of Leningrad:

"Operational camouflage is a great art. There is no such thing as a talented military leader who does not concern himself with it. It is a pity that it receives only superficial treatment in many military memoirs: We displayed for the enemy plywood tanks barely covered with branches, and the enemy, fool that he was, immediately fell for it. He began bombing the 'concentration of troops.' The troops were concentrating somewhere else, however.... No, it is not that easy to mislead the enemy. Even if he blows to splinters the 'combat equipment' made of materials acquired at a furniture factory, this does not mean that he has actually been fooled. The possibility cannot be ruled out that he is doing this as a ruse, pretending to take the bait when in fact the bombing attack upon the plywood may be a cunning move in a complicated game. And you must also hasten to make your move."

The general then spoke about the fact that operational camouflage does not tolerate approximation or incompletions. If the arrival of two tank divisions in a certain area is being simulated, for example, one must determine with a good knowledge of such matters how many bonfires should be displayed there for the night aerial reconnaissance and how many fighters will cover the area against daytime aerial reconnaissance—cover it thoroughly! And how many new radio sets will go on to the airways during that time, cautiously and following all the rules. A great many other things must also be foreseen and provided.

Colonel General L. Govorov, commander of the Leningrad Front, made a typical gesture with his arm, one which always commanded special attention, giving the small group of generals gathered around him to understand that he would now speak about something extremely important. And he began talking about

the fact that everything possible would have to be done to make Field Marshal Klucher, commander of the "Nord" army group, gradually arrive at the conviction that the Soviet forces would begin breaking through the "Northern rampart" from the Oraniyenbaum lodgment area with an offensive against Kingisepp and Narva. No other way but this. With naval landing forces and trying not to become separated from the coast. Leonid Aleksandrovich Govorov was speaking directly to Lieutenant General D. Gusev, front chief of staff, but he kept glancing toward Major General A. Bystrov, chief of the front counterintelligence directorate. It was as though he were asking the latter as he assigned the mission: "Is it clear that this applies to you as well as the chief of staff? Are the chekists ready? Do you have any original ideas?"

Unfortunately, interesting ideas do not always come up exactly when they are needed. Headquarters began the lodge job in the ordinary way—with the same night bonfires and the sound of motors. Specially detailed sub-units moved during the day toward the right flank of the POG (coastal operational group), returning with the onset of darkness to their point of departure....

The day of 7 August 1943 was the precise date of the birth of a concept which took the camouflaging of actual changes being made at the lodgment area beyond the realm of the conventional. It belonged to Lieutenant Colonel P. Sosnikhin, chief of a chekist subunit focusing upon counter-intelligence work mainly in the enemy's rear. Attractive and equally risky, the idea developed rapidly and by 10 August had been approved by the front military council. We will speak about the concept later, however.

The bonfires, the sound of motors and the dust on the roads naturally created acute interest in the right flank of the coastal operational group on the part of Hitlerite intelligence, and the chekists made a special effort to see that none of those participating directly in the operational camouflage found himself in the unenviable position of "talking," that all conceivable channels through which information on the camouflaging might leak beyond the front line were cut off. Such a situation requires labor-consuming measures on the part of the opponents. Extensive use is made of technical equipment and clever logical techniques for evaluating the information acquired. No matter how much these are perfected from one war to another, however, the organizers of reconnaissance and counterintelligence always have need of a well-trained individual, one who has seen with his own eyes and heard with his own ears, or even better, touched with his own hand something of interest to his superiors. And therefore....

It was August 1943, on that side, the enemy's side. At Pskov. Lieutenant Colonel Shimmel, chief of the 104th Abwehr Command, which was expected to provide headquarters of the "Nord" army group with espionage information, was briefing a highly-trained agent, a graduate of the intelligence school at Walga, before sending him across the front line. This school had a good

reputation among the chiefs of Abwehr teams and groups. Most of them believed that only the "Tsellarus Bureau" based in Tallin had even higher standards. Frigate Captain Tsellarus trained primarily saboteurs, however, and this time Shimmel needed a "classic spy." And he was brought from Walga.

"You are Davydov, then. Captain Davydov," Shimmel uttered what could have been either a question or a statement, peering into the eyes of the man across from him.

"Yes, sir, Colonel. Commander of a separate combat engineer battalion. I am returning to my command post after inspecting objects built by my men at various places, mainly along the route indicated in the detached duty orders. The battalion itself is scattered out, which is why I am traveling about the forward line...."

"Splendid, Battalion Commander Davydov. Your documents are in perfect order, you hear, and there is absolutely nothing to draw suspicion. This is a very important moment! Let us sit and bow our heads for a moment before you leave."

Hans Shimmel, a "Russian specialist" born in Petersburg, loved to flaunt his knowledge of Russian customs.

After they had done so, he placed his hand upon the agent's knee in a familiar manner, as an equal, and briefly summed up the mission:

"And so, the main thing is the concentration site of the divisions arriving at the lodgment area, their numbers and where they come from. Anything else...."

"We will obtain the information, Lieutenant Colonel, sir"!

On the night of 6 August, Captain Fish delivered "Davydov" to the forward edge and the latter passed undetected through the neutral zone between the trenches of the Hitlerite and the Soviet troops and by dawn was already at the position of the 48th Separate Naval Rifle Brigade. The combat-engineer captain, to all appearances a combat officer and man of the trenches, aroused no suspicions whatsoever in anyone.

It is now 14 August, on our side. Leningrad. Lieutenant Colonel P. Sosnikhin is instructing an individual who will see with his own eyes and hear with his own ears how the Hitlerites perceive what is taking place in the "Oraniyenbaum kettle," as they refer to our glorious "No 5." Does Klucher believe that Soviet groups are concentrating near Kopor'ye? We have to make him believe this without any doubts!

"Bear in mind, Mokiy Dem'yanovich, that it will not be easy to fool Hans Shimmel. He has a lot of experience. He is an organizer of espionage in Russian territory with prerevolutionary time in service, as we say: He began before World War I."

"I am taking that into account."

"He will try to triple-check every statement in your report," Sosnikhin continued. "Furthermore, he will not attempt to conceal this from you but will check you out and observe you openly to see whether you are nervous or calm, whether you are planning to run. This does not mean that you have already made some sort of error or have given them cause to suspect you. This is simply their method. You must not give them any such cause, Mokiy Dem'yanovich! You can consider a concrete suspicion, not just a part of their overall methods, to be the end. Are you fully aware of this?"

"Yes, I know that if they really suspect me they will hang me immediately. Without any sort of investigation. Just in case."

The two men were silent for a time.

"And so, you know for a certainty," Sosnikhin continued, "that the 142d Separate Rifle Brigade and the 98th Rifle Division have arrived at the right flank of the 'kettle.' The 71st Separate Naval Rifle Brigade is being withdrawn to the rear. It will be reinforced and prepared for landing operations...."

The lieutenant colonel then went over the information which the man he was speaking with would give to the Germans as unverified, stating that he had heard it but could not vouch for its reliability....

"The front headquarters, and not I, thought up and prepared all of this! This is the 'gift' you will take to Shimmel, Mokiy Dem'yanovich. And there is so little time. We must make a countermove, though. Otherwise, time will run out. You are being sent to Bogdanov today. Tomorrow you will study the terrain from a map. There will be no other preparations."

On the night of 15 August Major A. Bogdanov, acting chief of the counter-intelligence section of the coastal operational group, reported by "VCh [high frequency]" to the front counterintelligence directorate that Mokiy Dem'yanovich Karashchenko was on the other side.

The reader who has not lost the train of the story up to this point and who has compared the briefings of intelligence agents on the enemy's side and on ours will already have understood what is going on. Yes, the pattern of events is in general a simple one: On 6 August, "Captain Davydov," an Abwehr agent, crosses over the front line. On 7 August, Lieutenant Colonel Sosnikhin learns precisely what information is of interest to the chief of

the 104th Abwehr Command and suggests that Shimmel be provided with false information. The lure of the concept is apparent, and the risk lies in the fact that a slip by the individual sent to the other side would mean his death and the failure of the entire operational camouflage plan.

We should add to the picture the fact that "Captain Davydov" and Mokiy Dem'yanovich Karashchenko, who was sent by Sosnikhin into the enemy's rear, are one and the same.

Senior Lieutenant M. Karashchenko, a participant in the desperate fighting near Liyepaye, was wounded three times in one day and was taken prisoner by the fascists in serious condition. He was barely able to walk when he attempted to escape. He did not make his way to freedom, however, but to a camp for condemned prisoners. Seeking out in camps such as this men crushed and broken by the terrible atmosphere of doom, the Abwehr agents thought they had found such a man in Nikulin, the name Karashchenko had given the Hitlerites. Nikulin "submitted to recruitment." This is how a man who had been a chekist since 1927 became a student at the Abwehr intelligence school. At the end of the 1920's and the beginning of the 1930's, he had disarmed saboteurs sent by the former owners of the Baku oil-fields to blow up, burn and destroy. He later served in the border troops. In short, he was an experienced and professional chekist.

There was naturally, a difficult and extremely critical moment in his decision "to join" the Abwehr in order to return to his own people, and not empty-handed: Would his own people believe that he was not a "double agent," that he had not accepted the enemy's proposition to save his own skin, that he had understood his duty in the given situation to be that of taking advantage of the opportunity to return to his formation and become an active fighter against the hated front. We know now that the chekists did not doubt the fact that the individual who returned to them from the other side was actually one of theirs and not an agent of the enemy. A few days later, he was sent out on an urgent mission.

When the Hitlerites began bombing the targets and areas indicated by "Nikulin-Davydov" no one at the headquarters of the Leningrad Front breathed a sigh of relief in the belief that Klucher had believed the false information. When the Hitlerite field marshal began regrouping his forces, however, reinforcing the "Northern rampart" in front of the right flank of the coastal operational group, when the SS motorized division "Nordland" and the SS motorized brigade "Niederlander" were sent there and the Hitlerites began frantically building a new defensive line from Narva to Ostrov, then it was possible to say that the operational camouflaging of the axis for the first strike had been extremely effective. The strike was carried out, as we know, on the Ropsha axis and ended with an inspiring victory.

It was not until 20 years later that M. D. Karashchenko's victory was described in the press: such is the lot of reconnaissance men and

counterintelligence agents. The chekist's extraordinary combat experience immediately drew the attention of writers and film makers. You have perhaps seen the film "The Triple Check" produced by the Riga Film Studio. It is about Karashchenko, although the hero in the film has another name. When you see it on the screen, however, you have to share your admiration between the hero in the film and the talent of the director. It appears that in certain spots the action has been heightened by the director's skill and that things were actually not so complicated.

"Is that so, Mokiy Dem'yanovich?"

"How can I put it?" answers the retired major, holder of the Orders of the Red Banner and the Patriotic War second degree, still strong although past the age of 70. "It would seem to be more simple, but, as I recall, it was even more complicated than shown in films. The film is called 'The Triple Check.' Shimmel checked me out 100 ways, however. He created situations in which a single act out of a dozen possible ones would not give me away. He used stool-pigeons. He would set traps for me such as lifting a glass of wine in my honor when the Hitlerites awarded me a bronze medal, drawing me into a heart-to-heart conversation and then unexpectedly asking: 'Tell me, what does your Leningrad look like now?' If I had answered without thinking, it would have been the end: After all, I had 'never been there.' One false move, and there would have been torture and death. Death is not frightening, however, when you understand how many lives your risk will save."

11499
CSO: 1801

AVIATION: MAINTENANCE PROCEDURES IN AIR REGIMENT DESCRIBED

Moscow AVIATSIYA I KOSMICHESKAYA in Russian No 10, Oct 79 signed to press
30 Aug 79 pp 30-31

Article by Guards Engineer Lieutenant Colonel L. Anishchenko, deputy regiment commander for IAS [aviation engineering service], in the section "Know-How--into IAS Practice": "For a High Reliability Factor"

Text Once when I was checking technical documentation, I discovered that for a long time there had been no entry in the records for an aircraft inspection by the deputy squadron commander for the IAS. I automatically thought: "The chief of the subunit's Aviation Engineering Service was not monitoring the condition of the bomber systems and units. And after all, the inspection schedules are precisely defined in the appropriate documents."

"The maintenance crew is strong and there have been no maintenance failures," the officer tried to justify himself.

The deputy commander for the IAS is no newcomer in his trade. He graduated from a higher military educational institution and has experience. But in this case he relaxed his professional vigilance and relied on the others. I had to have a serious talk with him and point out his improper attitude toward control over preparation of equipment for flights.

It is well known that the inspection is one of the most important forms of preventive maintenance and checking the condition of aircraft. All system and unit operational reliability largely depends on how the engineer organizes this matter. Moreover, inspection results permit the supervisor to obtain quite detailed information for analysis of causes of malfunctions revealed while maintaining the aircraft, and to take specific steps to see that mistakes are not repeated. In the control process, the engineer has the opportunity to check the knowledge and skill of the maintenance crew, and to find out how they are complying with the requirements of the appropriate instructions.

The level of development of modern aviation equipment presupposes scientific methods for maintaining it, profound specialized knowledge, and high

culture of servicing. Therefore, it is very important for an engineer inspecting aircraft to ensure that the inspection is truly an engineering one, and that the results of preventive maintenance performed on one aircraft are taken into account for the others without fail.

The necessity of the drive for effectiveness in preventive maintenance and of engineer participation in equipment inspections has been stressed repeatedly in the technical section of the methodological council, at meetings with deputy squadron commanders for the IAS, and at assemblies of TECh [technical maintenance unit] chiefs of detachments and maintenance groups. And progress has been made. Control over aircraft preparation has improved. The role of engineers in ensuring high maintenance reliability of aviation equipment and safety of flights has been enhanced.

And setting the example in this are Guards Engineer Major I. Burtolik, Guards Engineer Captain V. Potepukh, and Guards Engineer Senior Lieutenant Yu. Vaychnikauskas. They make efficient use of time during preliminary, preflight and postflight preparation of aircraft as well as on maintenance days. The experience of their work clearly persuades that inspections as well as the preliminary and preflight preparation are carried out with a high guarantee of reliability only if they are skillfully planned and well organized, and if each specialist is clearly assigned a specific task consistent with his knowledge and skill.

Guards Engineer Captain Potepukh's service has emerged victorious in socialist competition for a number of years. Inherent to this officer are continual research, profound scientific analysis of events and phenomena, and the aspiration to introduce advanced methods into the practice of IAS work and to make effective use of the experience of the best aviation engineers.

Potepukh is hardly ever in the office. As a rule, he is at the aircraft parking areas or the TECh working aprons, that is, there where the success of the trade is determined and where complicated situations can arise. And the guards engineer captain tries to find out about them personally so that he can later analyze them profoundly and make competent technical decisions, organize the work of his subordinates, and help them to do everything in a highly qualitative manner and on time.

One must say that his subordinates are also noted for exemplary technical culture in servicing aircraft and for aspiration to persistently improve professional skill. It is a pleasure to see the cleanliness and order in all the areas where the service specialists work. Convenient shelves and cabinets have been made, for example, for storage of spare parts, equipment and instruments, and the property inventory was done accurately. There are many catalog charts, graphs, posters, drawings and other visual aids in the training rooms.

Our leading engineers pay a great deal of attention to analysis of information on the condition of aircraft systems and sets of equipment. They keep special logs to record everything associated with maintenance of aircraft equipment, and inspections and tests of it. After analysis, many facts and examples are used in technical critiques and when conducting classes.

The amount of work now performed by the aviation engineer is very great. But as noted, his role in carrying out the complex of preventive maintenance steps on aviation equipment and in the organization of control is especially important. Let us take, for example, the preliminary and pre-flight preparation. In the process of it as well as on maintenance days according to previously developed plans, each engineer checks the condition of the aviation equipment. All aircraft must be inspected by him within the prescribed period. We are striving to see that the results of the check on one bomber has a positive effect on the maintenance of the others. The high guarantee of functional reliability of all aircraft systems and units largely depends on the quality of all this work. And here it is very important to know how to properly make up the teams of specialists from the maintenance groups and provide them with everything needed.

We had a case this year in which the squadron chief of the IAS was at fault in having the aviation equipment prepared for flights by a maintenance team which was not at its prescribed strength. In this case no mistakes were made, but in a service meeting we had to have some serious discussions about what had happened. In a meeting, the party committee discussed the question of enhancing the responsibility of the communists-chiefs for the quality of preparation of aviation equipment for flights. The talk was basic and useful. All attendees made the necessary conclusions from it, and additional socialist pledges to master related specialties were made.

Regiment engineers through specialties in particular tightened control over the organization and planning of preliminary preparation. During it they are now located at the air squadrons, help the deputy subunit commanders for the IAS carry out the assigned tasks, and frequently make in-depth aircraft inspections themselves. When they discover problems, the engineer-chiefs take specific steps to eliminate them. Taking a creative approach to this matter are Guards Engineer Majors A. Akulov and V. Krivenko and other officers.

The assistance by the seniors is needed and useful to the juniors. After all the number of tasks on the day of preliminary preparation is quite large. It includes not only work on aviation equipment, aircraft inspections and elimination of problems detected. We check on how the tools, test and measuring equipment, and ground maintenance facilities allotted to the subunit or aircraft are being maintained, how the technical records are filled out, and we conduct simulator sessions.

Thus, at the initiative of one of the engineers, the simulator has come into use during training sessions with IAS personnel. The regiment commander approved this. As a result, the training process has been improved.

After all, where but in a simulator can trouble be modeled to show the specialists how an aircraft behaves in the air in such a case.

It is of course not easy for the deputy squadron commanders for the IAS to successfully cope with this amount of work, and especially for those who do not yet have sufficient experience. Here it is very important to help the officers at the opportune time to become effective and eliminate shortcomings more quickly. And in this, first and foremost, the deputy unit commander for the aviation engineering service plays a great role. He has to continually supervise the novice engineer-chief and show a daily interest in how things are going with him.

I will cite an example. At the beginning of the year, Guards Engineer Captain V. Yeliseyenko was assigned as the deputy commander for the IAS in one of the squadrons. Prior to this, the officer had served in our unit and had studied by correspondence at a higher educational institution. We knew well both the strong and the weak points of this specialist. We liked his persistence and purposefulness and his ability to organize work.

However, at first not everything went smoothly for Yeliseyenko, and mistakes were made. Sometimes the engineer-captain did not make high demands on his subordinates and waited for instructions from his superiors. His senior comrades helped him acquire self-dependence. Some time passed and matters adjusted themselves for the officer.

It must be confessed that we still have cases of engineers spending a large part of duty time in an office compiling accounts and reports instead of performing purposeful and effective work at the aircraft parking areas or in the TECh. To be sure, you cannot do without documents and cannot stop preparing them. But this does not at all mean that the IAS chief must focus his primary attention on "clearing" paperwork. Therefore, regiment engineers are trying to spend more time in the squadrons, helping to plan preliminary, preflight and postflight preparation of aircraft in the sub-units, and suggesting ways to better organize inspection of equipment and control over its condition. All this promotes improving preventive maintenance and raising the guarantee of reliability.

The training year is ending. In executing all the combat training missions assigned to the guards-aviators, IAS specialists have made their contribution too. Thorough engineering analysis of the condition of aviation equipment and skillful use, in the process of its maintenance, of the experience of the best engineers-innovators and real organizers of preventive maintenance will ensure a high factor of reliability and flight safety.

RIGHT: "Aviatsiya i kosmonavtika", 1979

1545
CSC: 1901

AVIATION: MAINTENANCE OFFICER'S WORK METHODS DESCRIBED

Moscow AVIATSIYA I KOSMONAVTIKA in Russian N° 10, Oct 79 signed to press
30 Aug 79 pp 32-33

[Article by Lieutenant Colonel R. Poberezhskiy: "Faithfulness to a Dream"]

[Excerpts] Officer V. Pavlovskiy's becoming a military aviation engineer is somewhat unusual. And at first, it even gave rise to doubt in some people for, they said, he did not graduate from a military academy and had not been in service very long. However, Pavlovskiy, the deputy squadron commander for the IAS [aviation engineering service], immediately put his working relationship with his subordinates on a proper footing and proved in deeds that he knows military life. After five and a half years of service, the aviation institute graduate became deputy commander for the IAS of a Military Transport Aviation squadron, after passing through many levels starting with the position of a fighter aircraft technician.

Several days after Pavlovskiy assumed his position, the personnel were roused at night by an "Assembly" signal. It was pitch-dark and there was a snowstorm. The new engineer went first to the command post, reported in, and then went to the parking areas. Crews set to work at once on the aircraft. But Pavlovskiy did not see any of the TECh [technical maintenance unit] detachment chiefs and did not receive any reports from them. Some technicians and mechanics, believing that everything was done, left to get warm in the huts. But the hands of the clock kept moving inexorably toward the time when the readiness of the aircraft for sorties had to be reported in accordance with the command.

The engineer captain checked with each crew to find out the overall status firsthand. As it came out later, the TECh detachment chiefs were at the small hot stoves too. However, such an attitude by the officers-leaders, of course, damped personnel ardor. Pavlovskiy had a strong talk with the IAS detachment chiefs and reminded them of specific statutes in the regulations and other legal documents. Then he assembled the maintenance group chiefs and made serious demands on them. The officer ordered everyone to work strictly according to plans while preparing the equipment without tolerating the slightest deviation.

"Our specialists in the main are experienced, why harass them?" they tried to oppose him.

"But you see, anything can happen," the engineer captain calmly replied. "Perhaps someone doesn't get notified, maybe someone couldn't make it to the airfield because of illness. We then are bound to help the crews do everything to prepare the aircraft in time and in all cases with high quality."

Pavlovskiy could have, of course, punished each of them without wasting time on talking. But he quite correctly believes that the method of persuasion in education is more reliable and effective, although it requires greater self-giving and input of nervous energy. Nevertheless, this does not at all mean that the deputy squadron commander for the IAS replaces exactingness with persuasion. He inexorably stands on guard of established order. I recall, literally before departure of an aircraft, where Senior Lieutenants of the Technical Service A. Otpushchennikov and V. Aksenov are in the crew, headquarters required that aircraft be placed in no-defect condition during the performance of routine maintenance. However, Aksenov, the senior airborne technician, acted in his own way. He made a superficial inspection of the aircraft and corrected only a couple of deficiencies. And the rest, the officer decided, will be done during performance of the periodic maintenance services.

Earlier, Aksenov had also treated preliminary work somewhat slightly. There were other specialists who had also acted the same way. Pavlovskiy took notice of this. He discussed each such case with the specialists and severely punished the guilty. The shortcomings were also discussed at a party meeting. The communists assessed what had taken place based on principles. The engineer captain now has reliable support in the collective from such as TECH detachment chiefs, Major of the Technical Service U. Bayramgalin, Captain of the Technical Service G. Ivanov and other experienced officers.

Party and Komsomol activists have worked hard and fruitfully to strengthen combat readiness. Moreover, Engineer Captain Pavlovskiy often consults the squadron commander and his deputy for political affairs and executes their instructions and recommendations precisely. This yields gratifying results.

The engineer has paid an especially great deal of attention to training engine technicians. The warrant officers had theoretical knowledge, but had to acquire practical skills in the squadron. Flying operations were intensive in that period. Personnel had almost no free time. Therefore, Pavlovskiy conducted practical training for the new specialists the following way. He looked over the engine together with the technician and asked him questions on the design and operation of the individual assemblies, units and systems. He inspected four aircraft and monitored four specialists. Then he compared everything and found out what his subordinates were weak in and where the gaps were in their knowledge. After this, he assigned

experienced officers-leaders to hold classes on a specific subject. And the time? It was found even during flights. When the aircraft took off on their flight routes the time was used to organize training classes.

In the squadron each specialist is frequently assigned individual tasks on specific theoretical and practical problems with a subsequent mandatory check on the quality of their mastery and methods. The engineer most often checks up himself, and, to be sure, you do not fake it or excuse yourself with him: he has an excellent knowledge of the equipment being serviced and all the work on it. . . .

Many of his superiors have spoken warmly and well of the deputy squadron commander for the IAS. And we met Engineer Captain Pavlovskiy himself on an ordinary day. After a general regimental formation, he defined the task more precisely with his subordinates and issued the necessary instructions. Some personnel had to perform prescribed equipment modernization at the airfield and set up posts for additional lighting in the parking areas.

"First, it will make night work easier for us," explained Vasiliy Petrovich, "and second, better lighting will promote a rise in morale."

We managed to talk of many things. Both about the difficulties of becoming an aviation engineer and about the peculiarities of the work with the personnel.

But he did not complain about the difficulties. He likes his work and the service--this is just what he dreamed of. Considerable credit is due the subunit's aviation engineering service headed by officer V. Pavlovskiy for the way squadron personnel are successfully carrying out the mission of flight preparation and confidently conquering competitive heights.

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8545
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AVIATION: PRE-FLIGHT TRAINING DEFICIENCIES REVIEWED

Moscow AVIATSIYA I KOSMONAVTIKA in Russian No 10, Oct 79 signed to press 30 Aug 79 pp 42-43

Article by Senior Lieutenant V. Usol'tsev: "It Could Not Happen, They Relied"

Text While checking on the preparation of flying personnel for flights, Captain I. Gayevoy, squadron navigator and specialist first class, asked a young officer a seemingly simple question:

"At what distance from the course line do the elevations "rise" on the map?"

The lieutenant answered smartly and accurately.

"You know the theory," Captain Gayevoy looked intently at the helicopter pilot-navigator. "Then why don't you make use of your knowledge in practice?"

"But I don't intend to deviate from the route at that distance," the lieutenant shrugged his shoulders. "I know the route, I've already flown it."

"And you're certain that when you're in the air, the weather won't change in the flight area and the directional system won't fail?"

The lieutenant kept silent.

"Also, the notes in your workbook were made carelessly," the subunit navigator continued. "Something could get confused in plotting them later on the knee chart."

Even though the young officer turned red, he tried to show by his whole appearance that Gayevoy's remarks were immaterial. Then one of the lieutenants remarked:

"But these are trivial details, comrade captain, they don't affect the flight."

"Trivial details?" Gayevoy was astonished. "That's exactly how all major problems start, with the small things. I'll tell you about several cases when such trivial details did not lead to major troubles purely by chance."

The officers prepared to listen to the navigator first class who had flown several thousand hours in airplanes and helicopters of various types during his years of service in the air force. But as before, some had slightly ironic smiles on their faces. Not paying them any mind, Captain Gayevoy began:

"Senior Lieutenant Nikitin served with me as a navigator. He had a reputation as a quite good specialist and always handled the missions successfully. But later he began preparing for flights less diligently. This was especially noticeable if they took place in the area of the home airfield. In short, he became presumptuous. And here's what happened one time."

"The crew in which Aleksey was the navigator had to perform a flight along a route. Nikitin outlined it on a flight chart. But he didn't get around to studying it carefully. The course line seemed simple to the officer, so he didn't even start marking the distinctive checkpoints on each leg of it."

"In flight, relying on his experience, Senior Lieutenant Nikitin visually determined his position occasionally instead of continually. As a result, he did not immediately notice that the wind, which had changed in force and direction, had blown the aircraft off the course line. And then the weather changed sharply again: it began to drizzle and visibility was reduced. Aleksey could not immediately determine the aircraft position, had to abort the mission and return to base on orders from the ground."

"And would this have happened if the navigator had marked the distinctive checkpoints and systematically monitored the aircraft position? Of course not. There's the trivial details for you," Captain Gayevoy concluded. He was silent for a second and then continued: "We had another crew headed by a military pilot first class with about 2,000 hours of flying time who also risked a flying accident because of a seemingly small mistake. Preparing the flight chart in a hurry, the navigator (also a first class, by the way) took the wrong first course. The ship commander and his deputy did not check the navigator's work because they relied on his experience."

"The flight took place beyond the clouds and it is difficult to surmise how it would have ended had the command post not intervened in time; you see, there was an air route with very intensive air traffic close by."

Captain Gayevoy noticed that not a trace of the smiles remained on the faces of the young pilots. But to convince his subordinates even more that when preparing for flights one must take literally everything into consideration and work without haste and strain, he decided to relate still another instructive case.

"How about keeping workbooks. It would seem that the quality of performance of a mission really does not depend precisely on this at all. That's what Lieutenant Volin thought too."

"One day we were preparing for low altitude flights. The acting subunit navigator outlined the forthcoming flight route on the board, the pilots copied it in their workbooks, and then began calculating the necessary data. Volin believed that he need not waste time on filling in documentation accurately, and it was better to read the instructions or text on helicopter flying once again. He made his notes carelessly."

"The officer did not immediately begin calculating the route: he had other things to do. When he did start, however, he couldn't make out which was the flight departure point IPM and which was the terminal KPM. The navigator's notes had already been erased from the board, and written there were the conditions of problems on switching courses. Volin would not ask for the necessary information from his comrades: he didn't want to hear their gibes. Getting it all wrong, he took the KPM for the IPM and calculated the reverse route. It is not difficult to imagine what could happen when two helicopters are flying at low altitude on head-on courses. But the commanders monitoring the preparation for the flights detected the lieutenant's mistake. This case was discussed in detail with all flying personnel and the pilots understood to what careless filling out of a workbook can lead."

"I understand too," said the young pilot-navigator to whom Captain Gayevoy had made his comments at the start of the session.

"Well fine, then it won't be necessary to return to this anymore," the squadron navigator concluded. "Remember that there is nothing major or minor in our work, there is only the main things. If something is not taken into account prior to the flight, you could pay for it."

The young officers began to work diligently. Checking on their preparation the next time, Captain Gayevoy found no mistakes.

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AVIATION: COMMENTS ON "HARRIER" VTOL AIRCRAFT

Moscow AVIATSIIA I KOSMONAVTIKA in Russian No 10, Oct 79 signed to press
30 Aug 79 pp 46-47

Article by Major V. Shishov, in the section "Abroad": "Capitalist Countries' Warplanes, Part 3. Who Has an Eye to the 'Harrier'?"

Text The distinguishing feature of the English "Harrier" fighter is vertical take-off and landing [VTOL]. Its tactical and technical characteristics are typical for an attack warplane intended for aerial reconnaissance and direct aviation support of troops. Maximum speed at 300 m altitude is 1150 km/h, vertical speed from ground is 178 m/s, practical ceiling is 15,000 m, engine thrust is 8,710 kg force, and maximum take-off weight is 10,000 kg. Combat radius depends on flight profile and may reach 650 km. The aircraft has four points for hanging bombs, NURS [free-flight rockets], and two 30-mm guns in containers with unit of fire of 130 shells each. Weight of entire combat load is 2240 kg.

When the first "Harrier" fighter subunits were formed, experts expressed the view that the VTOL would not produce a substantial revolution in the tactics of aviation support. However, enhancement of effectiveness of operations was expected in three areas.

First--improvement of combat qualities through an increase in payload, accuracy of navigational and aiming systems, reduction in structural weight, good controllability and an unobstructed view from the cockpit.

Second--tactical flexibility: rapid preparation of the aircraft for sorties for performing various missions; elimination of special equipment; conformity to conditions of joint operations by aviation and ground forces; discontinuance of lengthy patrolling in the air; savings in fuel and airframe life.

Based on the foreign press

Third--independence of fixed airfields with a hard surface; possibility of location at field sites close to the forward edge of one's own troops (the natural camouflage at such sites eliminates the need for organization of heavy cover by air defense weapons and ensures invulnerability); immediate reaction to requests by ground commanders for air support; and rapid arrival of aircraft to targets indicated by them.

The good conditions for search and detection of camouflaged objectives and the selection of weapons most suitable for destruction of them were supposed to separate the "Harrier" from the environment of aircraft with conventional take-off and landing characteristics. The modern reconnaissance equipment suspended in pods, the inertial navigation system and the aiming information display on the front windshield could assist in this. Several aircraft in the squadron were specially adapted for aerial reconnaissance and photography.

A British Royal Air Force "Harrier" wing (36 aircraft) is based at Vil'deprat Air Base, FRG. As FLIGHT magazine reported, about 50 landing fields for use only in wartime and 30 fields for practicing combat training missions in peacetime have been equipped in West Germany and countries contiguous to it. Three to four aircraft will be located at each field during combat operations. They are supplied by a mobile depot of supplies, equipment and POL which also has servicing equipment and ammunition.

The Royal Air Force is responsible for protecting the landing fields and servicing combat operations by the "Harrier" aircraft. The ground forces, however, furnish them communications. Combat missions are assigned through an air representative. Transportation (cargo) helicopters are used to haul supplies to the depots and fields.

In their daily combat training, pilots practice missions for shifting bases and operations from landing fields in close contact with ground force sub-units. Here is how the magazine described the situation in an exercise.

A camouflaged "Harrier" makes a short-run landing at the edge of a forest after a 50-mile reconnaissance flight. It is immediately covered with a camouflage net and the cassettes of exposed film are removed. While the film is being interpreted in a mobile photo lab, the pilot gives an intelligence officer additional information which is used to compile the report to ground force headquarters. If headquarters decides to make an air strike on a target detected, depending on the nature of the target, high-explosive or napalm bombs, free-flight rockets, and guns are hung on the aircraft designated for the strike operations. The flight to the target is made at an altitude of 80 meters which reduces the countermeasure of organic FVO weapons.

In addition to the landing field in the forest, there are tents for the flying personnel and officers responsible for organization of flights and support of coordination, as well as vehicles and the necessary equipment.

Not far away are the radio stations which receive calls from the ground forces and transmit intelligence to them. The aircraft at the fields are well camouflaged.

The experience of the exercises, as foreign experts indicate, has shown that the principles of air support have remained as before, and aviation has been used in a centralized fashion for successive execution of missions in the interests of all the services of the armed forces. The English journal ROYAL AIR FORCE QUARTERLY wrote that the "Harrier" aircraft will operate together with others in the interests of the allied army which assumes the primary strike. And on the other hand, if it is the British Army of the Rhine that finds itself in this situation, then in accordance with the principle of flexible response, not only all the VTOL subunits would be used in its interests, but also the other units of the NATO countries' air forces.

However, as foreign experts believe, hopes for strengthening the first echelon of support forces by locating "Harrier" aircraft near the "front line" were not realized. Reaction to ground force requests has become faster, but is still not entering into the dynamics of the ground battle. It was concluded that further improvement at all levels of the command, control and communications system is needed to ensure the operational value of the VTOL aircraft. A comparison of the combat capabilities of the "Harrier" with other tactical aircraft, which had performed similar missions, showed the following.

Call reaction time for "Phantom" aircraft based at an airfield 90 km from the "front line," from the time the request was made until the attack on the target, was 50 minutes. "Harrier" aircraft based at fields close to the forward edge of the troops saved no more than 5 minutes, which was 10 percent of the total time for organization of air support.

Significant difficulties have arisen in training a large number of highly skilled technicians to service flights by small subunits at many fields. The quantity of expensive ground equipment has been increased. Organization of flying at the flight level differs little from that at the squadron level, for each field has its own facilities for refueling, testing, preparation of weapons and control. Thus, one "Harrier" sortie from a dispersed location is very costly.

A gain has been shown only in ensuring aircraft invulnerability under conditions of the limited warning time of a threat. Small "Harrier" subunits could conduct "combat operations" from airstrips irrespective of results of surprise attacks on fixed airfields. However, air support effectiveness has not turned out to be as substantial as expected. Therefore, the first VTOL aircraft does not now have a "family successor" abroad.

The U.S. Marine Corps bought 30 "Harrier" fighters (designated the AV-8A), then increased the order to 108 aircraft. The Swiss magazine INTERNATIONAL

DEFENSE REVIEW wrote that the marine air force needs to fulfill command requests for fire support in time and with sufficient forces. Experience gained in assault operations, as well as analysis of operations at the company-battalion level, has shown that air support is needed most at the outset of combat operations. Therefore, air force reaction time plays an important role here. As a rule, operations at the battalion level can be foreseen 30 minutes prior to their initiation and in such cases planning support regarding place, forces and time is complicated.

Stemming from this, an expeditionary airfield, transportable by vessels and ships, has been developed in the U.S. Marine Corps for the first time, and the conclusion that it is necessary to have VTOL aircraft in the inventory was made.

Marine air support operations are conventionally divided into three phases: operations from primary bases afloat, from bases afloat and airfields (airstrips) ashore simultaneously, and from airfields (airstrips) ashore. The AV-8A's have taken part in several exercises and made up to four sorties per day during prolonged "combat operations" and up to six sorties in intensive periods. As this experience has shown, 50 percent of the sorties had to be planned in advance; 10 percent occurred at night; 15 percent, from forward airstrips; and 20 percent, with full combat load. Combat radii varied within a broad range and at low altitude were half that indicated in the aircraft tactical specifications. The conclusion was made that equipping the Marine Corps with VTOL aircraft was justified.

In exercises in South Korea, thanks to employment of an improved system for control of support forces, the AV-8A proved to be 30 percent more effective than the F-4, and outlays for the flights were 5 percent less.

Peking expansionists have shown interest in the "Harrier" fighter. The government of Great Britain has expressed its readiness to sell the VTOL aircraft to the PRC, although Chinese aggression in Vietnam has clearly shown how irresponsibly the fortunes of peace are regarded in Peking and with what criminal ease the Chinese leadership resorts to arms.

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